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  INTRODUCTION	  	  	  	  	  Corralling	  high	   level	  accused	  war	  criminals	   into	   the	  dock	  has	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  a	  persistent	  problem	  for	  international	  criminal	  courts.	   	   Unlike	   the	   Nuremberg	   defendants	   in	   1945,	   secured	   in	  Allied	   hands,	   this	   generation	   of	   accused	   perpetrators	   are	  typically	  not	  in	  custody	  at	  the	  time	  they	  are	  indicted	  and	  indeed	  may	   be	   still	   performing	   important	   official	   duties	   for	   their	  countries,	   including	   acting	   as	   Heads	   of	   State	   or	   engaged	   in	  leading	   opposition	   forces	   seeking	   to	   unseat	   the	   country’s	  government.	   	   Even	   when	   out	   of	   power,	   former	   civilian	   and	  military	   leaders	   accused	   of	   war	   crimes	   may	   be	   in	   hiding,	  protected	   by	   powerful	   political	   or	   military	   forces	   within	   the	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  State.	   	   In	   such	   situations,	   the	   task	  of	  producing	   the	   accused	   for	  trial	  in	  an	  international	  court	  can	  pose	  insurmountable	  problems	  for	  the	   international	  court,	  which	  has	  no	  police	   force	  of	   its	  own	  to	   execute	   its	   orders	   and	   must	   depend	   on	   the	   cooperation	   of	  independent	  sovereign	  states	  to	  gain	  custody.	  	  The	  record	  of	  the	  United	  Nations-­‐sponsored	  ad	  hoc	  and	  hybrid	   	   courts	  and	  of	   the	  treaty-­‐based	   International	   Criminal	   Court	   (“ICC”)	   in	   securing	  expeditious	  custody	  of	  their	  most	  notorious	  defendants	  has	  been	  uneven,	   threatening	   in	   some	   cases	   to	   overshadow	   and	   taint	  generally	   favorable	   scorecards	   as	   to	   total	   numbers	   of	   accused	  successfully	  processed.,	   	  This	  article	  seeks	  to	  assess	   the	  success	  of	   international	   cooperation	   in	   apprehending	   international	  war	  crime	  defendants,	  the	  causes	  of	  any	  deficit,	  and	  some	  suggestions	  for	  	  progress.	   	  	  A.	   THE	  RECORD	  OF	  INTERNATIONAL	  AND	  HYBRID	  COURTS	  IN	  APPREHENDING	  DEFENDANTS	  	  	  The	  enabling	  statutes	  of	  some	  international	  courts1	  specifically	  instruct	   the	   courts	   to	  prosecute	  on	  a	  priority	  basis	   those	   “most	  responsible”	   for	   the	   most	   serious	   war	   crimes,	   crimes	   against	  humanity,	   and	   genocide.2	   In	   virtually	   all	   cases,	   the	   Chief	  
 *	  Chief	  Judge,	  U.S.	  Court	  of	  Appeals	  (D.C.	  Cir.)	  (ret.);	  Judge,	  International	  Court	  Tribunal	  for	  the	  Former	  Yugoslavia	  (1999-­‐2001).	  	   1.	   In	   this	   article,	   international	   courts	   should	   be	   read	   to	   include	   hybrid	  courts,	   i.e.,	   those	   with	   both	   national	   and	   international	   judges	   such	   as	   the	  Special	  Court	  of	  Sierra	  Leone	  (“SCSL”).	  
	   2.	   See	   Agreement	   Between	   the	   United	   Nations	   and	   the	   Government	   of	  Sierra	   Leone	   on	   the	  Establishment	   of	   a	   Special	   Court	   for	   Sierra	   Leone,	  U.N.-­‐Sierra	  Leone,	  art.	  1,	  Jan.	  16,	  2002,	  2178	  U.N.T.S.	  137	  (establishing	  the	  Special	  Court	   for	   Sierra	   Leone	   to	   “prosecute	   persons	   who	   bear	   the	   greatest	  responsibility	   for	   seriously	   violations	   of	   international	   humanitarian	   law	  and	  Sierra	  Leonean	   law	   .	   .	   .”);	  S.C.	  Res.	  827,	  U.N.	  Doc.	  S/RES/827	  (May	  25,	  1993)	  (expressing	   that	   the	   International	   Criminal	   Tribunal	   for	   the	   Former	  Yugoslavia	   (“ICTY”)	   is	   aimed	   at	   the	   prosecution	   of	   “persons	   responsible	   for	  serious	  violations	  of	  international	  humanitarian	  law”);	  see	  also	  S.C.	  Res.	  1503,	  U.N.	  Doc.	  S/RES/1503	  (Aug.	  28,	  2003)	   (noting	   that	   the	   ICTY	  strategy	  should	  “concentrate	  on	  the	  prosecution	  or	  trial	  of	  the	  most	  senior	  leaders	  suspected	  of	  being	  most	  responsible	  for	  crimes	  within	  the	  ICTY’s	  jurisdiction	  .	  .	  .”).	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  Prosecutors	   have	   publicly	   adopted	   the	   “most	   responsible”	  criteria	  as	  their	  prosecutorial	  priority.3	  	  Certainly,	  the	  success	  of	  the	   tribunals	   is	   commonly	   judged	   by	   the	   media	   and	   by	   expert	  commentators	   in	   terms	   of	   their	   ability	   to	   bring	   the	   highest-­‐ranking	  perpetrators,	  Heads	  of	  State,	  army	  chiefs,	  and	  ministers	  into	  custody.4	  	  Yet,	  this	  top	  echelon	  of	  war	  criminals	  is	  invariably	  the	   hardest	   to	   secure,	   and	   even	   successful	   efforts	   often	   come	  many	   years	   after	   indictment	   or	   issuance	   of	   an	   arrest	   warrant.	  	  Despite	  a	  commendable	  record	  of	  eventually	  accounting,	  in	  some	  official	   manner,	   for	   all	   161	   of	   its	   indictees,	   the	   International	  Criminal	   Tribunal	   for	   the	   former	   Yugoslavia	   (“ICTY”)	   took	   an	  excruciatingly	  long	  time	  after	  indictment	  to	  obtain	  custody	  of	  its	  three	   most	   prominent	   defendants:	   Slobodan	   Milosevic,	   former	  President	   of	   Yugoslavia	   and	   Serbia	   (five	   years);	   Radovan	  Karadzic,	   Bosnian	   Serb	   President	   (thirteen	   years);	   and	   Radko	  Mladic,	   head	   of	   the	   Bosnian	   Serb	   Army	   (sixteen	   years).5	   	   In	  
 
	   3.	   See,	  e.g.,	  Office	  of	  the	  Prosecutor,	  Int’l	  Criminal	  Court,	  OTP	  Road	  Map	  in	  
the	   Libyan	   Situation	   Announced	   by	   the	   Prosecutor	   at	   the	   20th	   Diplomatic	  
Briefing,	   82	   OTP	   WEEKLY	   BRIEFING,	   Apr.	   5–11,	   2011,	   at	   2	   [hereinafter	   Issue	  
#82],	  available	  at	  http://www.icc-­‐cpi.int/	  NR/rdonlyres/DA36410D-­‐5E1F-­‐4AE6-­‐B3F7-­‐3EDFD14ACACC/283219/	  OTPWeeklybriefing_	  511April2011.pdf	  (stating	  that	  the	  ICC	  Prosecutor’s	  Office	  is	  “	  now	  focusing	  on	  identifying	   those	   who	   bear	   the	   greatest	   criminal	   responsibility”);	   see	   also	  Office	   of	   the	  Prosecutor,	   Int’l	   Criminal	   Court,	  Prosecutor	  Reports	   to	  UNSC	   on	  
the	   Situation	   in	   Libya,	   85	   OTP	   WEEKLY	   BRIEFING,	   Apr.	   26–May	   2,	   2011,	   at	   2	  [hereinafter	   Prosecutor	   Reports	   to	   UNSC],	   available	   at	   http://www.icc-­‐cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/	   62E64ECC-­‐9AE4-­‐4790-­‐A9F1-­‐961D4E10B0FA/283297/OTPWeeklyBriefing	  26April2May201185.pdf	   (explaining	   that	   ICC	   Office	   of	   the	   Prosecutor	   “will	  focus	   investigations	   and	   prosecutions	   on	   those	   who	   bear	   the	   greatest	  responsibility	   for	   the	   most	   serious	   crimes,”	   including	   individuals	   “who	  ordered,	  incited,	  financed	  or	  otherwise	  planned	  the	  commission	  of	  the	  alleged	  crimes”).	  
	   4.	   But	  see	  Editorial,	  A	  Step	  Forward	  in	  Serbia,	  WASH.	  POST,	  May	  27,	  2011,	  at	  A20	  (noting	  that	  despite	  the	  capture	  of	  some	  high	  ranking	  perpetrators,	  other	  offenders	   are	   not	   intimidated	   because	   trials	   in	   the	   Hague	   and	   the	   ICC	   are	  “costly”	  and	  “interminable,”	  which	  ultimately	  hinders	  the	  tribunals’	  success);	  	  Mark	   Palmer	   &	   Patrick	   Glen,	   Op-­‐Ed.,	  The	   Crime	   of	   Dictatorship,	  WASH.	   POST,	  Sept.	  28,	  2011,	  at	  A15	  (Notwithstanding	  the	  successful	  indictment	  of	  Sudan’s	  Bashir,	   Bashir	   remains	   president	   and	   “no	   country	   through	   which	   he	   has	  traveled	  has	  tried	  to	  arrest	  him.”).	  
	   5.	   See	  Aleksander	  Roknić,	  New	  Mladic	  Arrest	  Bid	  a	  “Media	  Show”,	  INST.	  FOR	  WAR	   &	   PEACE	   REPORTING	   (Nov.	   6,	   2010),	   http://iwpr.net/report-­‐news/new-­‐
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  Northern	   Sudan	   (Darfur),	   arrest	   warrants	   issued	   by	   the	   ICC	  against	   President	   Al	   Bashir,	   for	   genocide	   and	   crimes	   against	  humanity,	   and	   his	   minister	   Ahmad	   Harun,	   for	   crimes	   against	  humanity,	   have	   been	   outstanding	   since	   2009	   and	   2007,	  respectively.6	   	  This	  is	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Darfur	  referral	  to	  the	  ICC	  came	  from	  the	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council	  and	  was	  followed	   by	   a	   report	   from	   the	   ICC	   to	   the	   Council	   of	  noncooperation	  by	  Sudan,	   as	  well	   as	  numerous	  entreaties	   from	  ICC	   Chief	   Prosecutor	   Luis	   Moreno-­‐Ocampo	   to	   the	   Council	   to	  bring	  pressure	  on	  the	  Government	  of	  Sudan	  to	  hand	  the	  over	  the	  subjects	  of	  the	  warrants.7	  The	  more	  recent	  unanimous	  referral	  of	  the	  Libya	  situation	  to	  the	  ICC	  by	  the	  same	  Security	  Council,	  and	  the	   ICC’s	   issuance	   of	   warrants	   for	   Muammar	   Qaddafi,	   his	   son,	  and	  the	  head	  of	  Libyan	  intelligence8	  discussed	  later	  in	  this	  article,	  raised	   similar	   questions	   of	   how	   their	   apprehension	   was	   to	   be	  achieved.	  Supporters	  of	  international	  courts	  argue	  that	  indictments	  and	  warrants,	   even	   if	   incapable	   of	   execution	   in	   the	   accused’s	   home	  country,	   still	   carry	   significant	   deterrent	   value	   because	   the	  accused	  may	  be	  inhibited	  from	  travelling	  far	  from	  home,	   lest	  he	  be	   arrested	   by	   another	   country’s	   police	   pursuant	   to	   treaty,	  
 mladic-­‐arrest-­‐bid-­‐media-­‐show	   (noting	   that	   Mladic	   had	   been	   evading	   arrest	  since	  the	  Hague	  indicted	  him	  in	  1995);	  see	  also	  Tracey	  Gurd,	  Arresting	  the	  “Big	  
Fish”:	   Lessons	   on	   State	   Cooperation	   for	   the	   International	   Criminal	   Court,	   in	  AEGIS	  TRUST,	  THE	  ENFORCEMENT	  OF	  INTERNATIONAL	  CRIMINAL	  LAW	  27,	  29–30	  (Nick	  Donovan	  ed.,	  2009)	  (describing	  Milosevic’s	  1999	   indictment	  and	  subsequent	  arrest	  in	  2001,	  as	  well	  as	  how	  Karadzic	  remained	  a	  fugitive	  for	  thirteen	  years	  after	  being	  indicted	  in	  July	  1995).	  
	   6.	   See	  Office	  of	  the	  Prosecutor,	  Int’l	  Criminal	  Court,	  Situation	  in	  Darfur,	  the	  
Sudan,	  97	  OTP	  WEEKLY	  BRIEFING,	  July	  20–25,	  2011,	  at	  2	  [hereinafter	  Issue	  #97],	  
available	   at	   http://www.icc-­‐cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/CD685ECC-­‐A4B5-­‐442F-­‐9E5D-­‐8491F594AEEC/283627/OTPWeeklyBriefing_	  2025July2011.pdf	  (stating	  Al	  Bashir’s	  and	  Harun’s	  arrest	  warrants	  are	  among	  three	  warrants	  that	  remain	  outstanding	  in	  Sudan).	  
	   7.	   See	  id.	  (describing	  the	  referral	  of	  the	  situation	  in	  Darfur	  to	  the	  ICC,	  the	  initiation	   of	   an	   investigation	   in	   2005,	   and	   the	   various	   charges	   against	   Al	  Bashir	  for	  genocide).	  	   8.	   Office	  of	  the	  Prosecutor,	  Int’l	  Criminal	  Court,	  Situation	  in	  Libya,	  97	  OTP	  WEEKLY	   BRIEFING,	   July	   20–25,	   2011,	   at	   3	   [hereinafter	   Situation	   in	   Libya],	  
available	  at	  http://www.icc-­‐cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres	  /CD685ECC-­‐A4B5-­‐442F-­‐9E5D-­‐8491F594AEEC/283627/OTPWeeklyBriefing_2025July2011.pdf.	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  United	   Nations	   obligation,	   or	   universal	   jurisdiction.	   	   Out-­‐of-­‐country	  arrests	  have	   in	   fact	  occurred	   in	   the	   case	  of	   John-­‐Pierre	  Bemba,	   a	   high-­‐ranking	   politician	   in	   the	  Democratic	   Republic	   of	  Congo	  (DRC)	  accused	  of	  crimes	  committed	  in	  the	  Central	  African	  Republic	  (CAR)	  who	  was	  seized	  by	  Belgian	  police	  while	  travelling	  in	  Brussels,	   and	   is	   now	  on	   trial	   at	   the	   ICC.9	   	   French	   police	   also	  arrested	   another	   ICC	   accused,	   Callixle	   Mbarushmena,	   the	  Executive	  Secretary	  of	  a	  rebel	  army	  faction	  in	  the	  DRC,	  while	  on	  a	  visit	  to	  Paris.10	  On	  the	  other	  hand	  Omar	  Al-­‐Bashir,	  the	  Sudanese	  President	  who	  is	  the	  subject	  of	  a	  2009	  ICC	  indictment,	  has	  been	  welcomed	  in	  several	  African	  and	  Mid-­‐East	  countries,	  (though	  not	  in	  others)	  as	  well	  as	  in	  China	  and	  Iran;	  further,	  European	  Union	  leaders	   attended	   his	   most	   recent	   inauguration.11	   	   Similarly	  Charles	   Taylor,	   former	   Liberian	   President	   under	   indictment	   by	  the	   Special	   Court	   of	   Sierra	   Leone,	   after	   initially	   being	   given	  asylum	   in	  Nigeria	  was	   later	   turned	  over	   to	   the	  Special	  Court	  of	  Sierra	   Leone	   but	   only	   after	   widespread	   opposition	   to	   his	  
 	   9.	   Press	  Release,	  Office	  of	  the	  Prosecutor,	  Int’l	  Criminal	  Court,	  ICC	  Arrest	  Jean-­‐Pierre	  Bemba	  –	  Massive	  Sexual	  Crimes	   in	  Central	  African	  Republic	  Will	  Not	   Go	   Unpunished	   (May	   24,	   2008),	   http://www.icc-­‐cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/Situations/Situation+ICC+0105/	  Related+Cases/ICC+0105+0108/Press+Releases/;	   see	   also	   Office	   of	   the	  Prosecutor,	   Int’l	   Criminal	   Court,	   Situation	   in	   the	   Central	   African	   Republic	  
(CAR),	  92	  OTP	  WEEKLY	  BRIEFING,	   June	  15–20,	  2011,	  at	  3	  [hereinafter	  Situation	  
in	   the	   CAR],	   available	   at	   http://www.icc-­‐cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/632983C6-­‐9B9A-­‐4A60-­‐AC8B-­‐4D6ADFCB7927/283476/OTPWeeklyBriefing_1520June2011.pdf	  (noting	  that	  Bemba’s	  trial	  started	  on	  November	  22,	  2010).	  	   10.	   Office	   of	   the	   Prosecutor,	   Int’l	   Criminal	   Court,	   Situation	   in	   the	  
Democratic	  Republic	  of	  the	  Congo	  (DRC),	  92	  OTP	  WEEKLY	  BRIEFING,	  June	  15–20,	  2011,	   at	   2	   [hereinafter	   Situation	   in	   the	   DRC],	   available	   at	   http://www.icc-­‐cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/632983C6-­‐9B9A-­‐4A60-­‐AC8B-­‐4D6ADFCB7927/283476/OTPWeeklyBriefing_1520June2011.pdf.	  
	   11.	   See,	  e.g.,	  Mark	  S.	  Ellis,	  Op-­‐Ed.,	  Peace	  for	  All	  or	  Justice	  for	  One?,	  N.Y.TIMES,	  Aug.	   11,	   2011,	   http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/12/opinion/12iht-­‐edellis12.html	  (explaining	  that	  the	  ICC	  indicted	  Al	  Bashir	  in	  2009	  on	  charges	  of	  war	  crimes	  and	  crimes	  against	  humanity);	  Andrew	  Higgins,	  China	  Stands	  by	  
its	   Ally	   in	   Oil,	  WASH.	   POST,	   June	   23,	   2011,	   at	   A10	   (noting	   that	   since	   Bashir’s	  2009	  indictment,	  he	  has	  been	  welcomed	  in	  China	  to	  engage	  in	  oil	  discussions,	  and	   in	   Iran	   to	   attend	   the	   Global	   Fight	   Against	   Terrorism	   International	  Summit);	   see	   also	   Bashir	   to	   be	   Sworn	   in	   Amid	   Limited	   International	  
Participation,	   SUDAN	   TRIBUNE,	   May	   26,	   2010,	  http://www.sudantribune.com/Bashir-­‐to-­‐be-­‐sworn-­‐in-­‐amid-­‐limited,35211	  (explaining	  that	  local	  EU	  representatives	  attended	  Bashir’s	  inauguration).	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  presence	  in	  Nigeria	  surfaced.12	  	  Although	  occasionally	  successful,	  relying	   on	   random	   visits	   by	   the	   accused	   to	   court-­‐friendly	  countries	   to	   secure	   custody	   of	   perpetrators	   is	   not	   an	   adequate	  apprehension	   or	   deterrence	   strategy	   for	   international	   courts.	  	  Though	   it	   has	   also	   been	   suggested	   that	   an	   accused	   leader	  who	  cannot	   travel	   to	   pursue	   his	   country’s	   interests	   abroad	  will	   lose	  face	   and	   forfeit	   diplomatic	   and	   economic	   opportunities	   for	   his	  homeland,	   empirical	   proof	   of	   such	   political	   disadvantages	   is	  scanty	   and	   certainly	   not	   a	   strong	   reed	   upon	   which	   an	  international	   court	   should	   rely	   to	   validate	   the	   credibility	   of	   its	  processes.13	  	  	  	  	  	   B.	   STATUTORY	  PROVISIONS	  FOR	  SECURING	  INTERNATIONAL	  COOPERATION	  FOR	  ARRESTS	  	  	  How	  then	  did	  the	  drafters	  of	  the	  international	  courts’	  enabling	  statutes	  expect	  to	  get	  the	  accused	  into	  court?	   	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  UN	   sponsored	   ICTY	   and	   its	   companion,	   the	   International	  Criminal	  Tribunal	  for	  Rwanda	  (“ICTR”),	  the	  tribunals	  were	  given	  “primacy	   over	   national	   courts”	   in	   cases	   that	   fell	   within	   their	  jurisdiction.14	  	  This	  authority	  authorized	  them	  to	  take	  such	  cases,	  
 
	   12.	   See	   James	  A.	   Goldston,	  Op-­‐Ed.,	  Mad	  Dog	   in	   the	  Hague?,	   FOREIGN	   POL’Y,	  May	   16,	   2011,	  http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/05/16/mad_dog_in	   _the_hague	  (explaining	  that	  Taylor	  was	  initially	  given	  asylum	  in	  exchange	  for	  the	  promise	  to	  abstain	  from	  participation	  in	  Liberia’s	  politics).	  	  Ironically,	  the	  United	  States	  reportedly	   brokered	   the	   deal	   by	  which	   Taylor	  was	   given	   asylum	   in	  Nigeria.	  
See	  Gurd,	  supra	  note	  5,	  at	  30	  (according	  to	  Nigeria,	  the	  United	  Nations,	  United	  States,	   African	   Union,	   and	   the	   Economic	   Community	   of	  West	   African	   States	  made	  the	  deal	  to	  allow	  Taylor	  to	  travel	  to	  Nigeria).	  
	   13.	   See,	  e.g.,	  Higgins,	  supra	  note	  11	  (suggesting	  that	  despite	  his	  outstanding	  arrest	  warrant,	  Bashir	  knows	  that	  he	  can	  travel	  to	  certain	  areas	  of	  Africa,	  the	  Middle	  East,	  and	  Asia	  without	  being	  arrested).	  	   14.	   International	  Tribunal	   for	   the	  Prosecution	  of	  Persons	  Responsible	   for	  Serious	   Violations	   of	   International	   Humanitarian	   Law	   Committed	   in	   the	  Territory	   of	   the	   Former	   Yugoslavia	   Since	   1991,	   Updated	   Statute	   of	   the	  International	   Criminal	   Tribunal	   for	   the	   Former	   Yugoslavia,	   art.	   9(2)	   (Sept.	  2009),	  http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Statute/statute_sept09_en.pdf	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  along	   with	   any	   accused	   in	   national	   custody,	   away	   from	   the	  national	   court.	   	   Indeed,	   this	   was	   how	   the	   ICTY	   managed	   after	  several	   years	   to	   get	   its	   first	   prisoner	   in	   the	   dock,	   by	   asserting	  primary	   jurisdiction	   over	   Dusko	   Tadic,	   who	   was	   then	   in	   the	  German	   criminal	   justice	   system.15	   	   As	   a	   loyal	   UN	   member,	  Germany	   dutifully	   complied	   with	   the	   ICTY	   demand.16	  	  	  	   	  Most	   ICTY	   accused	   however	   were	   not	   in	   any	   court’s	   prior	  custody	   so	   basically	   the	   ICTY	   had	   to	   rely	   on	   the	   slender	   hope	  they	   would	   surrender	   voluntarily	   or	   be	   tracked	   down	   and	  handed	   over	   by	   national	   police	   authorities,	   or	   by	   the	   NATO	  peacekeeping	   forces	   that	   were	   overseeing	   the	   Dayton	   Accords	  and	   had	   been	   given	   authority	   to	   arrest	   ICTY	   indicted	   suspects.	  	  None	  of	   these	  methods	  proved	  especially	  effective	   in	   the	   ICTY’s	  early	  years;	  the	  peacekeepers	  were	  for	  the	  most	  part	  notoriously	  inactive	   in	   making	   such	   arrests	   and	   it	   took	   several	   years	   for	  indictees	   to	   begin	   surrendering	   and	   those	   that	   did	   were	   often	  low	  and	  midlevel	  Bosniak	  accused	  rather	  than	  the	  leaders	  “most	  responsible”	   for	  war	   crimes.	   	   The	  Balkan	   countries	   formerly	   at	  war	  with	  one	  another	  —	  Serbia,	  Bosnia,	  and	  Croatia	  —were	  not	  anxious	   to	   cough	   up	   their	   “homeland	   heroes”	   to	   the	   fledgling	  court.	   	  The	  ICTR	  initially	  had	  somewhat	  better	  luck	  with	  getting	  neighboring	   countries,	   	  where	   those	   accused	  of	  participating	   in	  the	  horrendous	  1994	  genocide	  in	  Rwanda	  had	  fled,	  to	  cooperate	  in	   bringing	   the	   perpetrators	   before	   the	   international	   court.17	  	  The	   Rome	   Statute	   adopted	   in	   1998	   established	   the	   ICC	   as	   a	  
 [hereinafter	   ICTY	   Statute];	   see	   also	   International	   Criminal	   Tribunal	   for	  Rwanda,	  Statute	  of	   the	   International	  Criminal	  Tribunal	   for	  Rwanda,	  art.	  8(2)	  (Jan.	   31,	   2010),	  http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/English%5CLegal%5CStatute%5C2010.pdf	  [hereinafter	  ICTR	  Statute].	  
	   15.	   See	   Prosecutor	   v.	   Tadić,	   Case	   No.	   IT-­‐94-­‐1-­‐I,	   Decision	   on	   the	  Prosecutor’s	   Motion	   Requesting	   Protective	   Measures	   for	   Victims	   and	  Witnesses,	   ¶	   41	   (Int’l	   Crim.	   Trib.	   for	   the	   Former	   Yugoslavia	   Aug.	   10,	   1995)	  (rejecting	  Tadić’s	  challenge	  to	   the	  primacy	  of	   the	   ICTY’s	   jurisdiction	  because	  he	  lacked	  “locus	  standi”	  to	  “raise	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  entity’s	  sovereignty	  rights	  .	  .	  .”).	  
	   16.	   See	   id.	   (noting	   that	   Germany	   “unconditionally	   accepted”	   the	   ICTY’s	  jurisdiction);	  cf.	  ICTY	  Statute,	  supra	  note	  13,	  art.	  9(2).	  
	   17.	   Cf.	  Philip	  Shenon,	  War	  Crimes	  Suspects	  Seen	  As	  Living	  Openly	  in	  Bosnia:	  
French	   and	   U.S.	   Troops	   Draw	   Criticism,	   N.Y.	   TIMES,	   Dec.	   13,	   1999,	   at	   A14	  (describing	   criticism	   of	   the	   efforts	   of	   Western	   countries	   to	   apprehend	  suspected	  war	  criminals).	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  treaty-­‐based	   court,	   but	   while	   it	   gave	   the	   Court	   no	   primacy	  provisions	   like	   the	   ad	   hoc	   courts,	   it	   went	   further	   in	   specifying	  how	  those	  countries	  which	  joined	  the	  Court	  must	  “cooperate”	  in	  effectuating	  its	  processes.18	  	  Articles	  87,	  88,	  and	  89	  require	  States	  Parties	  to	  set	  up	  procedures	  for:	  cooperation	  with	  requests	  from	  the	  Court;	  cooperation	  under	  national	  laws;	  and	  the	  surrender	  of	  persons	  to	  the	  Court.19	   	  Other	  provisions	  in	  the	  Statute	  mandate	  cooperation	   in	   locating	   relevant	   witnesses	   and	   evidence	   on	  request	   of	   the	   Court;	   the	   taking	   of	   evidence	   from	   witnesses,	  including	  experts;	  questioning	  of	  persons	  under	  investigation	  by	  the	   ICC;	   facilitation	   and	   protection	   of	   potential	   ICC	   witnesses;	  examination	   of	   suspected	  war	   crime	   burial	   sites;	   access	   to	   and	  preservation	   of	   possible	   record	   evidence;	   seizure	   of	   forfeitable	  assets	   as	   proceeds	   of	   crime;	   and	   a	   “catch-­‐all”	   category	   for	   “any	  other	   type	   of	   assistance	   not	   prohibited	   by	   law.”20	  Were	  compliance	  with	  these	  obligations	  uniformly	  rigorous,	  the	  ICC	   accused	   located	   in	   any	   State	   Party	   would	   be	   automatically	  handed	  over	  to	  the	  ICC	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  procedures	  of	  that	  country	   for	   extradition	  or	   other	   transfer	  process.	   	   Article	   59	  of	  the	  Rome	  Statute	  requires	  that	  the	  accused	  be	  brought	  before	  a	  local	   magistrate	   to	   determine	   he	   is	   the	   person	   named	   in	   the	  warrant	   and	   has	   been	   accorded	   his	   rights	   under	   the	   Rome	  Statute	   and	   the	   custodial	   country’s	   law.21	   	   Such	   a	   pattern	   of	  compliance	   has	   not,	   alas,	   evolved	   for	   reasons	   discussed	   below,	  and	   it	   is	   not,	   of	   course,	   applicable	   to	   a	   non-­‐signatory	   state.	   	   Its	  main	  application	  would	  be	   in	   the	  native	  country	  of	   the	  accused	  where	   that	   country	   is	   a	   State	   Party.	  The	   Rome	   Statute	   also	   provides	   for	   voluntary	   surrender	   of	  
 
	   18.	   See	   Rome	   Statute	   of	   the	   International	   Criminal	   Court	   pmbl.,	   July	   17,	  1998,	  2187	  U.N.T.S.	  90	  [hereinafter	  Rome	  Statute]	  (emphasizing	  the	  need	  for	  “taking	   measures	   at	   the	   national	   level	   and	   .	   .	   .	   enhancing	   international	  cooperation”).	  
	   19.	   See	  id.	  art.	  87	  (elaborating	  general	  provisions	  on	  the	  ICC’s	  authority	  to	  request	  cooperation	  and	  assistance	  from	  States	  Parties);	   	  art.	  88	  (creating	  an	  obligation	  on	  the	  part	  of	  States	  Parties	  to	  have	  procedures	  under	  national	  law	  aimed	   toward	   cooperation);	   art	   89	   (requiring	   States	   Parties	   to	   comply	  with	  requests	   for	   the	   arrest	   and	   surrender	   of	   a	   person	   and	   authorize	  transportation	  through	  its	  territory).	  
	   20.	   See	   id.	   arts.	   86–102	   (establishing	   principles	   on	   international	  cooperation	  and	  judicial	  assistance).	  
	   21.	   See	  id.	  art.	  59.	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  accused	  or	   the	   issuance	  by	   the	  Court	  of	   a	   summons	   in	   lieu	  of	   a	  warrant.22	  	  Although	  voluntary	  surrenders	  were	  rare	  in	  the	  early	  years	   of	   the	   ICTY,	   they	   became	   more	   frequent	   as	   the	   tribunal	  gained	   credibility	   and	   the	   postwar	   governments	   of	   the	   Balkan	  countries	   assumed	   more	   pro-­‐ICTY	   stances	   in	   response	   to	  economic,	  political,	   and	  diplomatic	  pressures,	  which	  resulted	   in	  their	   “negotiating”	   voluntary	   surrenders	   by	   their	   residents.	   	   In	  the	  end,	  somewhere	  around	  two	  dozen	  defendants	  surrendered	  voluntarily.23	   	   Article	   58	   of	   the	   Rome	   Statute	   provides	   for	  summonses	  on	  the	  Prosecutor’s	  request	  “if	  the	  Pretrial	  Chamber	  is	  satisfied	  that	  there	  are	  reasonable	  grounds	  to	  believe	  .	  .	  .	  that	  a	  summons	  is	  sufficient	  to	  ensure	  the	  person’s	  appearance	  .	  .	  .	  with	  or	  without	   conditions.”24	   	   The	   ICC	   has	   in	   fact	   successfully	   used	  summons	   in	   lieu	  of	  arrest	  warrants	   in	  nine	   instances,	   including	  two	   Darfur	   defendants	   accused	   of	   attacks	   on	   African	   Union	  peacekeepers,	  and	  more	  recently	   in	   the	  case	  of	  six	  Kenyan	  high	  level	   individuals	  allegedly	   “most	  responsible”	   for	   the	   thousands	  of	  killings,	  rapes,	  and	  civilian	  displacements	  that	  occurred	  in	  that	  country’s	   post-­‐election	   violence	   of	   2007.25	   	   The	   original	  conditions	  attached	  to	   the	  Kenya	  summonses	   included	  a	  bar	  on	  any	  contacts	  with	  victims	  or	  witnesses	  or	  other	  interference	  with	  the	   ICC	   investigation,	   attendance	   at	   all	   required	   ICC	   hearings,	  
 
	   22.	   See	   id.	   art.	   58(7)	   (“[T]he	   Prosecutor	   may	   submit	   an	   application	  requesting	   that	   the	   Pre-­‐Trial	   Chamber	   issue	   a	   summons	   for	   the	   person	   to	  appear.”)	  	   23.	   It	  is	  difficult	  to	  obtain	  an	  exact	  number	  of	  voluntary	  surrenders	  to	  the	  ICTY.	   	   See	   JULIE	   KIM,	   CONG.	   RESEARCH	   SERV.,	   RS22097,	   BALKAN	   COOPERATION	   ON	  WAR	   CRIMES	   ISSUES	   2	   (2008)	   (“From	   late	   2004	   to	   early	   2005,	   a	   spate	   of	  transfers	   of	   mainly	   Bosnian	   Serb	   indictees	   took	   place,	   many	   the	   result	   of	  voluntary	   surrenders	   negotiated	   by	   Serbian	   authorities.”).	   In	   addition,	   the	  report	   affirms	   that	   former	   Yugoslav	   Army	   generals	   and	   the	   Kosovo	   Prime	  Minister	   surrendered	   in	   late	   2005.	   	   At	   that	   time	   there	   were	   only	   four	  remaining	  indictees,	  none	  of	  whom	  later	  surrendered.	  	  	  Id.	  at	  2-­‐3.	  See	  generally	  STEVEN	   WOEHREL,	   CONG.	   RESEARCH	   SERV.,	   RS21686,	   CONDITIONS	   ON	   U.S.	   AID	   TO	  SERBIA	   2–4	   (2008)	   (detailing	   the	   surrender	   of	   six	   indictees	   in	   2002,	   four	   in	  2003,	  and	  	  fourteen	  in	  2006	  to	  the	  ICTY).	  	   24.	   Rome	  Statute,	  supra	  note	  18,	  art.	  58.	  
	   25.	   See,	   e.g.,	   Office	   of	   the	   Prosecutor,	   Int’l	   Criminal	   Court,	   Judges	   Assess	  
Possibility	  of	  Holding	  Confirmation	  of	  Charges	  Hearing	   in	   the	  Kenya	  Cases,	   91	  OTP	  WEEKLY	  BRIEFING,	   June	  9–14,	  2011,	  at	  3	  [hereinafter	  Issue	  #91],	  available	  
at	   http://www.icc-­‐cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/C947FAC2-­‐60B9-­‐4998-­‐AFDC-­‐90E040217B64/283622/	  OTPWeeklyBriefing_914June2011.pdf.	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  and	  abstention	   from	  committing	  new	  crimes.26	   	  At	   the	  suspects’	  first	  appearance	  supplemental	  conditions	  were	  requested	  by	  the	  Prosecution	  involving	  financial	  disclosures	  and	  a	  bar	  against	  any	  public	   statements	   that	   could	   be	   construed	   as	   a	   threat	   to	  prospective	   witnesses,	   as	   well	   as	   additional	   personal	  appearances	  at	  the	  Hague	  every	  six	  months	  to	  certify	  compliance	  with	   the	   conditions.27	  	   The	   Rome	   Statute	   authorizes	   the	   Court	   to	   make	   findings	   or	  inform	   the	   Security	   Council	   of	   a	   country’s	   noncooperation	   in	  handing	  over	   the	   accused.28	   	   In	   the	   case	  of	  Al	  Bashir,	   the	  Court	  reported	  noncooperation	  involving	  the	  government	  of	  Sudan	  and	  the	   Prosecutor	   has	   made	   several	   complaints	   to	   the	   Security	  Council	   urging	   it	   to	   put	   pressure	   on	   Sudan	   to	   comply	   without	  results,	  even	  though	  it	  was	  the	  Security	  Council	  that	  referred	  the	  Darfur	   situation	   to	   the	   ICC.29	   	   Indeed	   the	   Security	   Council	   has	  been	  petitioned	  by	  Kenya	  under	  Article	  16	  of	  the	  Rome	  Statute	  to	  suspend	   any	   further	   action	   by	   the	   ICC,	   but	   to	   date	   it	   has	   not	  moved	   on	   the	   petition	   (the	  United	   States,	   though,	  who	   is	   not	   a	  member	  of	  the	  ICC,	  has	  opposed	  deferral).30	  
 
	   26.	   See	   Issue	   #82,	   supra	   note	   3,	   at	   1	   (stressing	   that	   a	   violation	   of	   these	  conditions	  might	   “prompt	   the	  Chamber	   to	  replace	   the	  summonses	   to	  appear	  with	  warrants	  of	  arrest”).	  
	   27.	   Id.,	   at	   1	   (warning	   summoned	   individuals	   that	   triggering	   further	  violence	  by	  “dangerous	  speeches”	  would	  result	  in	  arrests).	  
	   28.	   See	  Rome	  Statute,	  supra	  note	  18,	  art.	  87(5)(b)	  (providing	  that	  when	  a	  state	   “fails	   to	  cooperate	  with	   requests	  pursuant	   to	  any	  such	  arrangement	  or	  agreement,	   the	  Court	  may	  so	   inform	  the	  Assembly	  of	  State	  Parties	  or	   .	   .	   .	   the	  Security	  Council”).	  
	   29.	   See	   ICC	  Prosecutor	  Seeks	  Non-­Cooperation	  Ruling	  Against	  Sudan,	  VOICE	  OF	   AM.	   (Apr.	   22,	   2010),	   http://www.voanews.com/english/news/africa/ICC-­‐Prosecutor-­‐Seeks-­‐Noncooperation-­‐Ruling-­‐Against-­‐Sudan-­‐91807509.html;	   see	  
also	   Issue	   #82,	   supra	   note	   3,	   at	   3	   (stating	   that	   the	   U.N.	   Security	   Council	  referred	  the	  situation	  in	  Darfur	  to	  the	  ICC	  in	  March	  2005).	  
 30. See Stella Ndirangu, Coal. for the Int’l Criminal Court, Kenyan Civil Society 
Calls on UNSC to Refuse ICC Investigation Deferral, 42 THE MONITOR, May–Oct. 
2011, at 13 (explaining	   that	  Kenyan	   authorities	   requested	   that	   the	  U.N.	   Security	  Council	  defer	   ICC	   investigation	   and	   that	   the	   African	   Union	   endorsed	   this	   request,	  despite	   civil	   society’s	   opposition	   to	   these	   actions);	   Omar	   Al-­Bashir,	  ENOUGHPROJECT.ORG	   (Feb.	   12,	   2009),	  http://www.enoughproject.org/category/special-­‐topic/omar-­‐al-­‐bashir	  (stating	  that	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  African	  Union,	  the	  Arab	  League	  and	  China	  have	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  Two	  other	  provisions	  in	  the	  Rome	  Statute	  have	  some	  potential,	  albeit	  indirectly,	  to	  facilitate	  the	  handover	  of	  accused.	  	  One	  is	  the	  self-­‐referral	  of	  “situations”	  to	  the	  ICC	  by	  State	  Parties	  themselves	  pursuant	   to	   Articles	   13(a)	   and	   14.31	   	   Indeed	   so	   far	   four	   of	   the	  seven	   pending	   ICC	   prosecutions	   or	   formal	   investigations	   have	  resulted	   from	   self-­‐referrals;	   two	   have	   been	   Security	   Council	  referrals	  (Sudan	  and	  Libya)	  and	  one	  (Ivory	  Coast)	  was	   initiated	  by	  the	  Prosecutor.32	   	  The	  self-­‐referred	  cases	   include	  Democratic	  Republic	   of	   the	   Congo	   (“DRC”),	   the	   Central	   African	   Republic	  (“CAR”),	   Uganda,	   and	   Kenya.	   	   When	   a	   State	   Party	   refers	   a	  situation	   to	   the	   ICC,	   it	   promises	   cooperation	   with	   any	   ensuing	  investigation	   even	   if	   the	   original	   referral	  was	   based	   on	   alleged	  crimes	   by	   an	   opposition	   or	   rebel	   leader	   and	   the	   investigation	  progresses	  to	  involve	  malfeasance	  by	  personnel	  of	  the	  referring	  State	  itself,	  which	  has	  happened	  in	  several	  instances.	  	  In	  practice	  however,	   this	   broad	  kind	  of	   cooperation	  does	  not	   always	   come	  about.	   In	   the	  DRC,	   for	   instance,	   five	  warrants	  have	  been	   issued	  against	  rebel	  army	  leaders	  and	  only	  one	  is	  still	  at	  large,	  one	  was	  arrested	  in	  Paris,	  and	  the	  other	  three	  were	  arrested	  by	  the	  DRC	  government	  with	  the	  help	  of	  a	  United	  Nations	  and	  African	  Union	  peacekeeper	   force.33	   	   However,	   complaints	   have	   been	  made	   by	  the	   UN	   Rapporteur	   on	   Arbitrary	   Executions,	   and	   others,	   that	  inadequate	   steps	   are	   being	   taken	   to	   secure	   the	   fifth	   arrest.34	  	  
 also	   voiced	   support	   for	   a	   deferral,	   but	   the	   United	   States’	   opposition	   has	  “neutralized	  these	  efforts”).	  
	   31.	   See	  Rome	  Statute,	  supra	  note	  18,	  art.	  14	  (“A	  State	  Party	  may	  refer	  to	  the	  Prosecutor	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  one	  or	  more	  crimes	  within	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  Court	  appears	  to	  have	  been	  committed	  .	   .	   .	   .”).	  Subsequent	  articles	  lay	  out	  the	   process	   by	   which	   the	   Prosecutor	   investigates	   the	   “situation”	   and	   if	   he	  concludes	   there	   is	   a	   reasonable	   basis	   to	   proceed,	   requests	   the	   Pretrial	  Chamber	   to	   authorize	   a	   formal	   investigation.	   	   See	   also	   Rome	   Statute,	   supra	  note	   18,	   arts.	   13,	   15	   (setting	   out	   the	   three	   situations	   where	   the	   ICC	   may	  exercise	   jurisdiction,	   including	   situations	  where	   the	   Prosecutor	  may	   initiate	  an	  investigation	  on	  his	  own).	  
	   32.	   See	   generally	   Issue	   #91,	   supra	   note	   25	   (describing	   the	   Prosecutor’s	  initiation	  of	  an	   investigation	   in	   the	  case	  of	  Cote	  d’Ivoire;	   self-­‐referrals	   in	   the	  case	   of	   the	   Democratic	   Republic	   of	   the	   Congo,	   Uganda,	   the	   Central	   African	  Republic	  and	  Kenya;	  and	  U.N.	  Security	  Council	  referrals	  for	  Sudan	  and	  Libya).	  
	   33.	   See	  Michael	  Gerson,	  Op-­‐Ed.,	  Reforming	  Congo’s	  Rebels,	  WASH.	  POST,	  Aug.	  26,	   2011,	   at	   A15	   (explaining	   that	   General	   Bosco	   Ntaganda,	   despite	   being	  indicted	  by	  the	  ICC,	  remains	  free).	  
	   34.	   See	   generally	   Report	   of	   the	   Special	   Rapporteur	   on	   Extrajudicial,	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   that	  may	   be	   because	   the	  DRC	  has	  subsequently	   incorporated	  rebel	   forces	   into	   its	  own	  militia,	  including	  the	  subject	  of	  the	  unexecuted	  fifth	  warrant,	  Ntaganda,	  and	  does	  not	  appear	  anxious	   to	  execute	   the	  warrant	  on	   “one	  of	  their	  own.”35	  	  The	  Ugandan	  government	  originally	  referred	  a	  situation	  to	  the	  ICC	   involving	   massive	   atrocities	   allegedly	   committed	   against	  civilians	   by	   the	   Lords	   Resistance	   Army	   (“LRA”)	   under	   the	  command	   of	   rebel	   leader	   Joseph	   Kony	   and	   several	   of	   his	  lieutenants.	  	  Five	  warrants	  were	  issued;	  none	  of	  which	  have	  been	  executed	  (two	  subjects	  have	  been	  killed).	  	  ICC	  supporters	  and	  the	  U.S.	  Ambassador	   to	  Uganda	  claim	  nonetheless	   that	   the	   issuance	  helped	   to	   entice	   Kony	   to	   peace	   negotiations,	   which,	   while	   not	  ultimately	   consummated,	   were	   followed	   by	   a	   temporary	  cessation	   of	   Kony’s	   atrocities	   in	   Uganda.36	   	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	  Kony,	   according	   to	   the	   ICC	   Prosecutor	   and	   the	   UN	   Secretary	  General,	   has	   since	   been	   responsible	   for	   thousands	   of	   more	  killings	   and	   abductions	   and	   hundreds	   of	   thousands	   of	  displacements	   in	   the	   CAR	   and	   in	   Southern	   Sudan.37	   	   Repeated	  calls	  for	  help	  from	  other	  African	  countries	  and	  the	  African	  Union	  in	   apprehending	   Kony	   and	   cutting	   off	   his	   supply	   sources	   have	  
 Summary	   or	   Arbitrary	   Executions,	   Addendum:	   Mission	   to	   the	   Democratic	  
Republic	   of	   the	   Congo,	   ¶106,	   U.N.	   Doc.	   A/HRC/14/24/Add.3	   (June	   1,	   2010)	  (describing	   General	   Bosco	   Ntaganda	   as	   the	   “most	   brazen	   example	   of	  impunity,”	   because	   he	   has	   not	   been	   arrested	   despite	   having	   an	   outstanding	  ICC	  arrest	  warrant	  for	  enlisting	  child	  soldiers	  and	  other	  war	  crimes).	  
	   35.	   See	   Gerson,	   supra	   note	   33	   (reporting	   that	   Tutsi	   rebel	   leader	   General	  Bosco	   Nataganda,	   despite	   his	   outstanding	   ICC	   warrant,	   now	   belongs	   to	   the	  DRC	  army,	  roams	  freely	  in	  the	  capital,	  dines	  in	  the	  best	  restaurants,	  and	  plays	  tennis	  at	  a	  major	  hotel).	  
	   36.	   See,	  e.g.,	  Yvonne	  Terlingen,	  Letter	  to	  the	  Editor,	  Amnesty	  for	  Ugandan?,	  N.Y.	  TIMES,	  Sept.	  20,	  2006,	  http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9	  E05E4D71031F933A	  1575AC0A9609C8B63	  (“Far	  from	  being	  a	  stumbling	  block,	  the	  indictment	  has	  served	   as	   a	   catalyst	   for	   the	   cease-­‐fire	   that	   has	   finally	   brought	   hope	   to	   the	  thousands	  of	  children	  kidnapped	  by	  the	  Lord's	  Resistance	  Army	  and	  forced	  to	  commit	  the	  most	  appalling	  crimes.”).	  
	   37.	   See	  Issue	  #97,	  supra	  note	  6,	  at	  3	  (“Since	  early	  2008,	  the	  LRA	  is	  reported	  to	  have	  killed	  more	  than	  2,000,	  abducted	  more	  than	  2,500	  and	  displaced	  well	  over	   300,000	   in	   DRC	   alone.	   	   In	   addition,	   over	   the	   same	   period,	   more	   than	  120,000	  people	  have	  been	  displaced,	  at	  least	  450	  people	  killed	  and	  more	  than	  800	   abducted	   by	   the	   LRA	   in	   Southern	   Sudan	   and	   the	   Central	   African	  Republic.”).	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  not	  yielded	  results.38	   	   In	  Kony’s	  case	  the	  referring	  State	  appears	  impotent	  to	  capture	  him	  as	  do	  the	  neighbors	  he	  is	  terrorizing,	  the	  UN,	  and	  other	   international	  groups	  who	  have	  continually	  called	  for	  his	  seizure	  over	  the	  past	  six	  years.	  	  Kony	  has	  publicly	  said	  he	  will	  never	  surrender	  to	  the	  ICC.39	  	  Uganda	  has	  set	  up	  its	  own	  war	  crimes	   tribunal	   in	   the	   interim.	   	   One	   commentator	   has	   warned	  that	   self	   referrals	   may	   be	   used	   manipulatively	   by	   referring	  countries	  to	  bring	  certain	  situations	  under	  ICC	  jurisdiction	  when	  they	  are	  capable	  of	  trying	  those	  cases	  themselves	  while	  retaining	  more	  desirable	  ones	  in	  their	  own	  national	  system.	  40	  	  In	  short,	  the	  ICC	   is	   in	  danger	  of	  being	  asked	   to	  do	   the	   referring	  State’s	  dirty	  work,	   running	   the	   risk	   that	   it	   will	   become	   a	   “garbage	   can”	   for	  national	   criminal	   systems	   to	   dump	   difficult	   or	   even	   politically	  dangerous	   cases.41	   	   If	   that	   happens,	   its	   intended	   function	   as	   a	  court	   of	   last	   resort	   will	   suffer.42	   	   In	   sum,	   the	   self-­‐referral	  mechanism	   frequently	   used	   and	   encouraged	   by	   the	   Prosecutor	  to,	   inter	   alia,	   facilitate	   arrests	  may	   have	   a	   built-­‐in	   potential	   for	  manipulation.	  The	   doctrine	   of	   complementarity,	   a	   key	   component	   of	   the	  Rome	   Statute,	   is	   potentially	   a	   second	   means	   of	   securing	  apprehension	   of	   a	   war	   criminal	   even	   if	   the	   end	   result	   is	   to	  prosecute	   him	   in	   a	   national	   court,	   not	   in	   the	   ICC.	   	   The	   Rome	  Statute	   provides	   that	   any	   country	   can	   intercede	   in	   an	   ICC	  
 
 38. See Office of the Prosecutor, Int’l Criminal Court, Kenya, 89 OTP WEEKLY 
BRIEFING, May 24–30, 2011, at 2 [hereinafter Kenya Report], available at 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/C16AB7D3-3BBA-4753-84FB-
7E802BDB7CE0/283406/OTPWeeklyBriefing_2430May2011.pdf 	  (describing	   the	   U.N.	   Secretary-­‐General’s	   report,	   which	   welcomed	   efforts	   to	  develop	   a	   sustained	   coordinated	   strategy	   to	  deter	   attacks	  by	   the	  LRA	   in	   the	  DRC);	   see	   also	   Issue	   #97,	   supra	   note	   6,	   at	   1	   (noting	   that	   the	   U.N.	   Security	  Council	  called	  for	  greater	  cooperation	  to	  execute	  ICC	  warrants	  against	  the	  LRA	  leaders).	  
	   39.	   See	   Jeffrey	   Gettleman	   &	   Alexis	   Okeowo,	   Warlord's	   Absence	   Derails	  
Peace	  Efforts	  in	  Uganda,	  N.Y.	  TIMES,	  Apr.	  12,	  2008,	  http://	  www.nytimes.com/	  2008/04/12/world/africa/12uganda.html	   (reporting	   that	   Kony	   “will	   not	  surrender	  until	  the	  [ICC]	  indictments	  are	  lifted”).	  
	   40.	   See	  Megan	  A.	   Fairlie,	  The	  United	   States	  and	   the	   International	  Criminal	  
Court	  Post-­Bush:	  A	  Beautiful	  Courtship	  but	  an	  Unlikely	  Marriage,	  29	  BERKELEY	  J.	  INT’L	  L.	  528,	  539-­‐53	  (2011)	  (discussing	  this	  conundrum	  in	  full).	  
	   41.	   Id.	  at	  576-­‐77.	  
	   42.	   See	   id.	  at	  560-­‐61	  (explaining	  that	  the	  Court’s	  role	  is	  to	  act	  “only	  when	  there	  is	  no	  feasible	  alternative	  forum	  for	  investigation	  and	  prosecution”).	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  or	  proposed	  prosecution	  on	  the	  ground	  that	   it	  has	  conducted	  or	  is	  conducting	  its	  own	  investigation	  or	  prosecution	  for	   the	   same	   conduct.43	   	   Unless	   the	   ICC	   Prosecutor	   can	  demonstrate	   to	   a	   Pretrial	   Panel	   that	   the	   country	   is	   unable	   or	  unwilling	  to	  bring	  a	  genuinely	  fair	  and	  purposeful	   investigation,	  prosecution,	   or	   trial,	   the	   ICC	   must	   step	   aside	   for	   at	   least	   six	  months	  (or	  unless	  circumstances	  change)	  and	  allow	  the	  country	  to	   handle	   the	   case.	   	   If	   ICC	   monitoring	   shows	   the	   State	   is	   not	  seriously	   pursuing	   the	   case,	   the	   ICC	   can	   reclaim	   the	   accused.44	  	  Theoretically,	   a	   country	   may	   be	   more	   willing	   to	   vigorously	  pursue	  an	  alleged	  war	  criminal	   if	   it	  can	  bring	  him	  to	  trial	   in	  his	  own	  country	  rather	  than	  hand	  him	  over	  to	  foreign	  judges	  for	  trial	  in	   a	   faraway	   land.	   	   There	   are	   examples	   of	   complementarity	  working.45	  	  Some	  commentators	  however	  have	  complained	  that	  the	  ICC	  is	  too	   rigid	   in	   its	   application	  of	   complementarity	  by	   insisting	   that	  the	   ICC	   accused	   be	   tried	   for	   precisely	   the	   same	   conduct	   in	   the	  national	   courts	   as	   is	   set	   forth	   in	   the	   ICC	   warrant.	   Some	   other	  commentators	   argue	   conversely	   that	   local	   prosecutors	   should	  charge	  the	  suspect	  with	  a	  “crime	  against	  humanity,”	  rather	  than	  
 
	   43.	   See,	   e.g.,	   Rome	   Statute,	   supra	   note	   18,	   art.	   17	   (“[T]he	   Court	   shall	  determine	  that	  a	  case	  is	  inadmissible	  where:	  The	  case	  is	  being	  investigated	  or	  prosecuted	  by	  a	  State	  which	  has	  jurisdiction	  over	  it	  .	  .	  .	  .”).	  
	   44.	   See	   id.	   art.	   18(3)	   (stating	   that	   the	   Prosecutor’s	   deferral	   to	   the	  investigation	  by	  the	  State	  is	  subject	  to	  review	  within	  six	  months	  or	  at	  any	  time	  based	  on	  a	  change	  in	  circumstances);	  see	  also	  Coal.	  for	  the	  Int’l	  Criminal	  Court,	  
Increasing	   Global	   Commitment	   to	   the	   Principle	   of	   Complementarity,	   42	   THE	  MONITOR,	  May–Oct.	   2011,	   at	   6	   [hereinafter	   Increasing	   Global	   Commitment	   to	  
Complementarity]	   (describing	   complementarity	   as	   the	   “cornerstone”	   of	   the	  ICC,	  which	  “requires	  that	  states	  assume	  primary	  responsibility	  for	  prosecuting	  grave	  crimes	  in	  national	  or	  regional	  courts”).	  
	   45.	   See,	  e.g.,	  Issue	  #91,	  supra	  note	  25,	  at	  2–3	  (noting	  that	  the	  OTP	  assisted	  Uganda’s	   investigation	  and	  trial	  of	  Thomas	  Kwoyelo,	  a	  LRA	  commander,	  and	  arranged	  that	  any	  information	  shared	  with	  Ugandan	  authorities	  be	  used	  in	  a	  trial	  that	  meets	  international	  justice	  standards);	  Office	  of	  the	  Prosecutor,	  Int’l	  Criminal	   Court,	   German	   Court	   Opens	   Trial	   Against	   Top	   FDLR	   Leadership,	   85	  OTP	  WEEKLY	  BRIEFING,	  Apr.	  26–May	  2,	  2011,	  at	  2,	  available	  at	  http://www.icc-­‐cpi.int/menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/office%20of%20the%20prosecutor/weekly%20briefings/otp260402052011	   (noting	   that	   the	  German	  court	  tried	  FDLR	  DRC	  rebel	  leaders	  for	  war	  crimes	  and	  crimes	  against	  humanity	   under	   Germany’s	   implementation	   law	   of	   the	   Rome	   Statute,	  which	  was	  cited	  as	  “one	  of	  the	  best	  examples	  of	  complementarity	  provided	  for	  by	  the	  Rome	  Statute”).	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  murder	  or	   rape	  even	   if	   they	  are	  based	  on	   the	  same	  conduct.	   	  A	  national	  prosecution	  for	  a	  serious	  crime	  of	  the	  same	  genre,	  even	  if	   it	   does	   not	   involve	   precisely	   the	   same	   conduct	   that	   the	   ICC	  would	   charge,	   should	   suffice	   to	   keep	   the	   ICC	   at	   bay.46	   	   To	   the	  extent	  that	  the	  ICC	  can	  hand	  over	  investigations	  or	  prosecutions	  conscientiously	   to	   national	   courts	   with	   reasonable	   assurances	  they	  will	  be	  punished	  at	  a	  comparable	  load	  of	  gravity	  legitimate	  aims	   of	   the	   Rome	   Statute	   will	   be	   satisfied.	   	   This	   could	   mean,	  however,	   that	   the	   national	   government’s	   realistic	   chances	   of	  apprehending	   the	   accused	   should	   be	   a	   component	   of	   that	  decision.	  	  Finally,	   the	   ICC	   Prosecutor	   has	   initiated	   a	   more	   informal	  program	   of	   “positive	   complementarity.”	   Upon	   receiving	  information	  indicating	  possible	  commission	  of	  war	  crimes	  within	  his	   jurisdiction,	  but	  about	  which	  he	  does	  not	  yet	  have	  sufficient	  information	   to	   open	   a	   formal	   investigation,	   he	   may	   begin	   a	  “preliminary	   investigation,”	  which	  can	  encompass	  not	  only	  fact-­‐finding	   on	   the	   alleged	   crimes	   but	   also	   the	   capabilities	   of	   the	  country’s	   law	   enforcement	   and	   judicial	   organs	   to	   conduct	   fair	  and	   efficient	   operations.	   	   In	   this	   endeavor	   he	   can	   encourage	  other	  countries	  and	  nongovernmental	  entities	   to	  donate	  money	  and	  technical	  assistance	  to	  struggling	  countries	  to	  upgrade	  their	  facilities.	   	   Although	   stressing	   the	   Court	   “is	   not	   a	   development	  agency”	  and	  will	  not	  directly	  provide	  money	  or	  technical	  know-­‐how,	  the	  Prosecutor	  has	  said	  he	  may	  encourage	  other	  entities	  to	  do	   so	   and	  will	   in	   appropriate	   cases	   share	   his	   information	  with	  the	   national	   authorities.47	   	   There	   are	   now	   nine	   “preliminary	  investigations”	   ongoing	   (some	   for	   as	   long	   as	   six	   years)	   in	  
 
	   46.	   Cf.	   Fairlie,	   supra	   note	   40,	   at	   567-­‐71	   (suggesting	   that	   the	   principle	   of	  complementarity	  applies	  to	  situations	  where	  national	  courts	  are	  prosecuting	  the	  accused	  under	  different	  charges	  than	  those	  that	   formed	  the	  basis	   for	  the	  prosecutor’s	   application	   for	   an	   arrest	  warrant);	  Prosecutor	  Reports	   to	  UNSC,	  
supra	  note	  2,	  at	  1	  (“[A]	  case	  is	  only	  inadmissible	  if	  the	  State	  is	  investigating	  or	  prosecuting	   the	   same	  person	   for	   the	   same	  conduct	   that	   is	   the	   subject	  of	   the	  case	   before	   the	   Court”	   and	   thus	   a	   State’s	   future	   “promis[e]	   to	   conduct	  proceedings	  is	  not	  a	  valid	  reason	  to	  modify	  this	  substantive	  criterion.”).	  
	   47.	   See,	   e.g.,	   Int’l	   Criminal	   Court,	   Assembly	   of	   State	   Parties,	  Report	   of	   the	  
Bureau	   on	   Stocktaking:	   Complementarity,	   ¶¶	   28-­‐36,	   U.N.	   Doc.	   ICC-­‐ASP/8/51	  (Mar.	   18,	   2010)	   (suggesting	   that	   the	   Court	   and	   State	   Parties	   should	  “facilitat[e]	  the	  exchange	  of	   information	   .	   .	   .	  aimed	  at	  strengthening	  domestic	  jurisdictions”).	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  Afghanistan,	  Colombia,	  Georgia,	  Palestine,	  Cote	  d’Ivoire,	  Guinea,	  Nigeria,	  Honduras,	   and	  Korea.48	   	   If	   successful,	   the	   reinvigorated	  local	  law	  enforcement	  and	  courts	  could	  identify	  and	  capture	  war	  criminals,	   particularly	   lower	   and	   midlevel	   perpetrators,	   while	  saving	   the	   resources	   of	   the	   ICC	   for	   the	   “big	   fish.”49	  	   	  	  	  C.	  OTHER	  NONSTATUTORY	  FORMS	  OF	  COOPERATION	  	  	  	   	  Assuming	   that	   a	   State	   sincerely	  wants	   to	   cooperate	  with	   the	  international	  court	  by	  turning	  over	  an	  accused,	  what	  techniques	  have	   proven	   useful?	   	   Rewards	   up	   to	   ten	   million	   Euros	   for	  information	   leading	   to	   the	   arrest	   of	   ICTY	   defendants	   Mladic,	  Karadzic,	   Hadzic,	   and	   others	   were	   offered	   for	   several	   years,	  though	   it	   is	   disputed	   whether	   they	   played	   a	   significant	   role	   in	  those	  defendants’	  ultimate	  capture.50	  	  There	  is	  greater	  agreement	  that	   pressure	   from	   the	   EU	   and	   its	   members,	   particularly	   the	  Netherlands,	   denying	   Serbia	   accession	   to	   the	   EU	   until	   it	  demonstrated	   vigorous	   efforts	   at	   locating	   and	   arresting	   the	  fugitives	   played	   a	   stronger	   role,	   although	   even	   their	   opinions	  differ	   as	   to	  whether	   Serbia	  was	  on	   the	  brink	  of	   being	   admitted	  even	  before	  Mladic	  was	  captured.	  	  Months	  before	  his	  capture,	  the	  EU	   President	   had	   announced	   Serbia	   was	   on	   a	   “positive	   track”	  toward	   imminent	  membership	   though	   the	  Netherlands	   and	   the	  ICTY	   Chief	   Prosecutor	   demurred	   on	   the	   energy	   of	   its	   efforts.51	  	  
 
	   48.	   See	  Issue	  #91,	  supra	  note	  25,	  at	  4-­‐5;	  see	  also	  Coal.	  for	  the	  Int’l	  Criminal	  Court,	   An	   Overview	   of	   ICC	   Preliminary	   Examinations,	   41	   THE	   MONITOR,	   Nov.	  2010–Apr.	  2011,	  at	  11	  (presenting	  an	  overview	  of	  preliminary	  examinations	  underway	   for	   crimes	   committed	   in	   Afghanistan,	   Colombia,	   Cote	   d’Ivoire,	  Palestine-­‐Gaza,	  Georgia,	  and	  Guinea).	  
	   49.	   Cf.	  Gurd,	  supra	  note	  5,	  at	  27-­‐28	  (highlighting	  how	  the	  limited	  resources	  of	   the	   ICC	   and	   lack	   of	   a	   standing	   police	   force	   means	   that	   the	   ICC	   relies	   on	  domestic	  authorities	  to	  execute	  arrest	  warrants	  against	  “big	  fish”).	  
	   50.	   See	  Roknić,	  supra	  note	  5	  (concluding	  that	  the	  increased	  rewards	  for	  the	  capture	   of	   Mladic	   and	   Hadzic	   did	   not	   lead	   to	   the	   capture	   of	   Mladic,	   and	  reporting	  Serbia’s	   interior	  minister	   comment	   that	   the	   capture	  of	  Mladic	  had	  “nothing	  to	  do”	  with	  the	  reward	  amount).	  
	   51.	   See	   Barrosso:	   Serbia	   on	   Positive	   Track	   Towards	   EU	   Membership,	  ALLVOICES	   (Jan.	   31,	   2011,	   2:38	   PM),	   http://www.allvoices.com/contributed-­‐
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  NATO	   for	  many	  years,	   though	  sometimes	  erratically,	   followed	  a	  similar	   policy	   of	   “conditionality”	   in	   withholding	   membership	  from	  Balkan	  countries.52	  When	  Mladic’s	  arrest	  finally	  happened,	  Western	  media	  touted	  it	  as	  a	  “victory	  for	  Western	  diplomacy.”53	  	  One	  commentator	  said	  it	  illustrated	  “the	  intensity,	  determination,	  and	  creativity	  needed	  by	   courts,	   states,	   and	   civil	   society	   to	   make	   state	   cooperation	  happen	   even	   when	   the	   chances	   of	   success	   look	   slim.”54	   	   There	  appears	  a	  consensus	  that	  “of	   the	  strategies	  available	   for	   forging	  cooperation,	  conditionality	  –	  on	  aid,	  group	  membership	  or	  trade	  benefits	   –	   has	   been	   the	   most	   successful	   in	   securing	   arrests.”55	  	  Withholding	   of	   military	   and	   economic	   aid	   from	   a	   country	  suspected	   of	   harboring	   an	   accused	   is	   a	   negative	   form	   of	  cooperation	   that	   court	   supporters	   cite	   as	   a	   successful	   spur	   to	  intensified	  efforts	  by	  a	  country	  to	  arrest	  fugitives.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  most	   notorious	   ICTY	   accused,	   the	   United	   States’	   persistent	  inclusions	  in	  the	  early	  2000s	  in	  appropriation	  legislation	  for	  aid	  to	  Serbia	  of	  conditionality	  clauses	  requiring	  Department	  of	  State	  certification	   of	   Serbia’s	   cooperation	   in	   tracking	   down	   fugitives,	  followed	   in	   the	   second	   half	   of	   the	   decade	   by	   the	   EU’s	   similar	  requirement,	   accounted	   for	   the	   majority	   of	   arrests.	   	   The	  withholding	   technique	   can,	   however,	   be	   difficult	   to	   utilize	  
 news/8054625-­‐barroso-­‐serbia-­‐on-­‐positive-­‐track-­‐towards-­‐eu-­‐membership	  (reporting	   that	   European	   Commission	   President	   Jose	  Manuel	   Barroso	   urged	  Serbia	   to	   obtain	   “concrete	   results”	   in	   capturing	  Mladic	   and	  Hadzic);	   see	  also	  
The	  Netherlands	  Wants	  Debate	  on	  Serbia’s	  EU	  Bid	  Postponed,	  SETIMES.COM	  (Oct.	  14,	   2010)	  http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes	  /features/2010/10/14/feature-­‐01	   (discussing	   the	   Dutch	   Parliament’s	  postponement	   of	   the	   decision	   on	   Serbia	   until	   Serbia	   shows	   full	   cooperation	  with	  the	  ITCY).	  
	   52.	   See	  KIM,	  supra	  note	  23,	  at	  4	  (providing	  a	  comprehensive	  discussion	  of	  the	   EU/NATO	   relationship	   with	   the	   Balkan	   countries	   based	   on	   the	  “conditionality	  of	  their	  efforts	  to	  obtain	  custody	  of	  the	  notorious	  defendants);	  Woehrel,	  supra	  note	  23	  (exploring	  the	  conditions	  that	  the	  United	  States	  placed	  on	  aid	  to	  Serbia,	  including	  the	  condition	  that	  Serbia	  cooperate	  with	  the	  ICTY).	  	   53.	   Editorial,	   Ratko	   Mladic's	   Capture	   is	   a	   Victory	   for	   Western	   Diplomacy,	  WASH.	  POST,	  May	  27,	  2011,	  at	  A20.	  	   54.	   Gurd,	  supra	  note	  5,	  at	  28.	  	   55.	   Id.	  at	  31.	  	  See	  also	  A	  Step	  Forward	  in	  Serbia,	  supra	  note	  3	  (asserting	  that	  Mladic’s	   arrest	   shows	   that	   “concerted	  and	   sustained	  pressure	   from	  Western	  governments	  can	  produce	  results	  on	  human	  rights”).	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  because	   of	   counter	   interests	   of	   the	   donor	   government	   in	  providing	   such	   aid.	   	   Ironically,	   the	   United	   States	   threatened	   to	  cut	   off	   military	   and	   economic	   aid	   in	   the	   early	   2000s	   to	   any	  country	   that	   agreed	   to	   turn	   over	   US	   residents	   under	   ICC	  warrants	  to	  the	  Court.56	  Ultimately,	  the	  U.S.	  has	  pulled	  back	  from	  such	   pressure	   in	   part	   because	   other	   countries	   like	   China	  threatened	  to	  fill	  the	  void.57	  	  More	  recently,	  the	  U.S.	  Ambassador	  to	   Sudan	   threatened	   to	   halt	   a	   process	   for	   taking	   Sudan	   off	   the	  State	  Sponsors	  of	  Terrorism	  list	  if	  it	  continued	  to	  support	  Kony’s	  LRA	   in	   Uganda.58	  	  Journalists,	   NGOs,	   and	   civil	   society	   in	   general	   can	   and	   have	  operated	   as	   nonofficial	   agents	   of	   cooperation	   in	   locating	   and	  tracking	   down	   fugitives	   as	   well	   as	   bringing	   pressure	   on	  governments	   to	  hand	   them	  over	   to	   the	   ICC.	   	  These	   sources	   can	  provide	   information	   leading	   to	   the	   whereabouts	   of	   accused	  persons	   and	   through	   their	   exposure	   of	   governmental	  recalcitrance	  or	   inefficiency	   they	   can	   create	  public	  pressure	   for	  arrests.	   	   In	  Nigeria,	   a	   public	   clamor	   to	  withdraw	   asylum	   status	  from	  Charles	  Taylor,	  former	  President	  of	  Liberia,	  helped	  to	  bring	  about	   his	   flight	   from	   that	   country	   and	   handover	   to	   the	   Special	  Court	  for	  Sierra	  Leone.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  media	  can	  reveal	  a	  disturbing	   lack	   of	   public	   sentiment	   for	   arrests.	   	   A	  poll	   a	  month	  before	  Mladic’	   arrest	   in	   Serbia	   showed	   that	   only	   15	   percent	   of	  those	   polled	   supported	   full	   cooperation	   with	   the	   ICC,	   and	   35	  percent	   said	   Serbia	   should	   not	   assist	   in	  Mladic’s	   seizure	   under	  
 
	   56.	   Cf.	  WILLIAM	  H.	  TAFT	  IV	  ET	  AL.,	  AM.	  SOC’Y	  FOR	  INT’L	  LAW,	  U.S.	  POLICY	  TOWARD	  THE	   INTERNATIONAL	   CRIMINAL	   COURT:	   FURTHERING	   POSITIVE	   ENGAGEMENT	   7-­‐12	  (2009)	   (describing	   the	  various	  efforts	  of	   the	  U.S.	  government	   to	  exempt	  U.S.	  citizens	   from	   the	   jurisdiction	   of	   the	   ICC,	   including	   the	   American	   Service-­‐Member’s	  Protection	  Act	  of	  2002	  and	  “Article	  98”	  agreements).	  
	   57.	   Cf.	   id.	   at	  12	   (noting	   that	   some	  of	   the	  unintended	  consequences	  of	   the	  United	  States’	  restrictive	  behavior	  include	  limited	  access	  and	  interaction	  with	  partner	  nations,	  which	  some	  military	  officials	  are	  concerned	  may	  create	  even	  more	  of	  an	  opening	  for	  China’s	  emerging	  presence).	  
	   58.	   Cf.	  Elizabeth	  Palchik	  Allen,	  Why	  Obama’s	  War	  in	  Uganda	  Isn’t	  Just	  About	  
Humanitarianism,	   THE	   NEW	   REPUBLIC	   (Nov.	   7,	   2011),	   http://www.tnr.com/	  article/world/97107/uganda-­‐war-­‐lords-­‐resistance-­‐army-­‐humanitarian	  (describing	   how	   Sudan’s	   support	   for	   the	   LRA	   is	   “one	   reason	  why	   the	   group	  has	  survived	  for	  so	  long”	  and	  noting	  that	  Sudan’s	  support	  has	  lessened	  due	  to	  “the	   Sudanese	   government’s	   desire	   to	   avoid	   being	   blacklisted	   as	   a	   U.S.-­‐designated	  state	  sponsor	  of	  terrorism”).	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  any	   circumstances.59	  At	  any	  rate,	  civil	  society	  groups	  have	  become	  important	  players	  in	   the	   court’s	   operation.	   	   The	   Coalition	   for	   the	   International	  Criminal	   Court	   is	   an	  umbrella	   organization	   for	  more	   than	   forty	  local	   and	   regional	   organizations	   across	   the	   globe	   that	  mobilize	  constituencies	   to	   campaign	   for	   ratification	   of	   the	   Rome	   Treaty,	  passage	   of	   implementing	   legislation	   for	   cooperation,	   and	  execution	   of	   Court	   judgments	   and	   arrest	   warrants.60	   	   Other	  organizations	  and	  coalitions	  engage	   in	  similar	  activities	  and	  the	  Prosecutor’s	   office	  meets	   regularly	  with	   these	   groups	   to	   solicit,	  incentivize,	   and	   orient	   their	   cooperation.	   	   It	   is	   difficult	   to	  evaluate	   the	   impact	   of	   this	   outside	   pressure	   but,	   for	   example,	  wide	  media	  coverage	  of	  civil	  society	  group	  protests	  of	  proposed	  visits	   by	   Al	   Bashir	   to	   other	   countries	   have	   been	   considered	  instrumental	   in	   the	   cancellation	   of	   some	   such	   visits.61	  	  Unfortunately,	   these	   forms	   of	   diplomatic	   and	   civil	   society	  cooperation,	   valuable,	   and	   indispensable	   to	   the	   Court	   as	   they	  may	  be,	  must	  confront	  formidable	  real	  world	  obstacles	  in	  hostile	  territories.	  	  	  	   D.	   OBSTACLES	  TO	  COOPERATION	  IN	  APPREHENDING	  HIGH	  LEVEL	  ACCUSED	  	  	  An	  assessment	  of	  the	  obstacles	  facing	  an	  international	  court	  in	  apprehending	  accused	  starts	  with	  the	  basic	  doctrine	  of	  national	  sovereignty.	   	   International	   courts	  have	  no	  police	   forces	  of	   their	  own	  but,	  even	  if	  they	  did,	  most	  countries	  are	  reluctant	  to	  give	  a	  free	   pass	   to	   any	   country	   or	   international	   body	   to	   enter	   their	  territory	   and	   arrest	   their	   residents.	   	   For	   example,	   consider	   the	  mixed	   reaction	   in	   Pakistan	   following	   the	   United	   States’	  
 	   59.	   Roknić,	   supra	   note	   5;	   see	   also	   Jovana	   Gec,	  Mladic	   Supporters,	   Police	  
Clash	  During	  Demonstrations,	  WASH.	  POST,	  May	  30,	  2011,	  at	  A6	  (explaining	  that	  7,000	   pro-­‐Mladic	   supporters	   demonstrated	   outside	   the	   Serbian	   Parliament	  demanding	  his	  release).	  	   60.	   COAL.	  FOR	  THE	  INT’L	  CRIMINAL	  COURT,	  http://www.iccnow.org	  (last	  visited	  Oct.	  21,	  2011).	  
	   61.	   See	  Ndirangu,	  supra	  note	  30,	  at	  7,	  (describing	  the	  efforts	  by	  civil	  society	  and	  States	  Parties	  to	  prevent	  visits	  by	  Bashir	  to	  Kenya	  and	  the	  CAR).	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  successful	   assassination	   of	   Osama	   Bin	   Laden	   that	   was	  accomplished	  without	  assistance	  or	  even	  notification	  of	  Pakistani	  officials.62	   	   Thus,	   in	   the	   final	   analysis,	   the	   onus	   on	   arrests	   has	  remained	   on	   the	   countries	   where	   the	   accused	   resides	   or	   has	  taken	  shelter.	   	  Sovereignty	  concerns	  are	  accentuated	  in	  many	  of	  these	   countries	   by	   the	   continuation	   in	   power	   of	   persons	   in	   the	  government	  or	  the	  military	  with	  residual	   loyalties	  to	  those	  they	  consider	   “homeland	   heroes,”	   despite	   what	   the	   Court	   decides	  about	   the	   legality	  of	   those	  persons’	  wartime	  activities.	   	  Mladic’s	  ability	   to	   withstand	   numerous	   “raids”	   and	   international	  pressures	   to	   hand	   him	   over	   for	   sixteen	   years	   is	   attributed	   to	   a	  corps	   	   of	   intractable	  military,	   intelligence,	   and	   other	   influential	  protectors	   with	   connections	   in	   the	   then	   current	   governments.	  	  When	  captures	  are	  facilitated	  by	  the	  suspects’	  own	  government,	  it	   is	   more	   often	   the	   case	   that	   new	   and	   reform	   minded	  governments	   have	   displaced	   those	   in	   which	   the	   sought-­‐after	  leaders	   participated,	   e.g.	  Milosevic	   had	   already	   been	   effectively	  deprived	   of	   power	   in	   Serbia	   at	   the	   time	   of	   his	   handover	   and	   a	  reform	   government	   was	   in	   place	   when	   Mladic	   was	   finally	  arrested.63	  	  Hardest	  of	  all	  to	  contend	  with	  is	  the	  apprehension	  of	  a	  Head	  of	  State	  who	  still	  wields	  official	  power,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Al	  Bashir	   in	   Sudan.	   	   It	   is	   unlikely	   that	   a	   leader	  will	   hand	  over	   the	  reins	   of	   power	   until,	   or	   unless,	   a	   coup	   takes	   place.	   	   Indeed,	  despite	   clear	   authority	   in	   the	   Rome	   Statute	   rejecting	   any	  impunity	  for	  sitting	  Heads	  of	  State,	  decisions	  of	  the	  International	  Court	   of	   Justice	   and	   debate	   among	   international	   scholars	   raise	  doubts	   for	   some	   that	   international	   law	   permits	   such	  
 
	   62.	   See	   Karin	   Brulliard,	   In	   Pakistan,	   Civilian	   Government	   Now	   Feeling	  
Backlash,	  WASH.	  POST,	  May	  8,	  2011,	  at	  A12	  (detailing	  the	  reaction	  of	  a	  former	  minister	  of	  the	  Pakistani	  government	  who	  called	  for	  the	  resignation	  of	  civilian	  government	  after	  the	  United	  States	  raid,	  deeming	  it	  a	  “failure	  of	  government”	  and	  a	  violation	  of	  sovereignty).	  
	   63.	   See	  Editorial,	  End	  of	   the	  Line,	  WASH.	  POST,	  May	  27,	  2011,	  at	  A26	   (“For	  more	   than	  15	   years,	  Mr.	  Mladic	  managed	   to	   evade	   capture,	   almost	   certainly	  with	  the	  help	  of	  some	  Serbian	  officials.	  Serbia’s	  President	  Boris	  Tadic	  is	  a	  new	  sort	   of	   leader,	   and	   last	   year	   Serbia	   formally	   admitted	   responsibility	   for	   the	  Srebrenica	  massacre	  and	  apologized”);	  see	  also	  A	  Step	  Forward	  in	  Serbia,	  supra	  note	   4	   (observing	   that	   Mladic	   and	   Bosnian	   Serb	   leader	   Radovan	   Karadzic	  “lived	  more	  or	  less	  in	  the	  open	  for	  years	  protected	  by	  the	  army	  and	  strongman	  Slobodan	  Milosevic.”).	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  prosecutions.64	   	   In	   any	   case,	   the	   overall	   chances	   of	   securing	  custody	   of	   a	   Head	   of	   State	   continue	   to	   be	   limited.	  	  	  	   Sometimes	   a	   divided	   government	   can	   aid	   the	   arrest	   process.	  Attentive	   court	   personnel	   and	   cooperative	   neighbors	   or	  supporting	  States	  may	  be	  able	  to	  cultivate	  dissident	  elements	  in	  a	   divided	   government,	  which	   can	  help	   in	   locating	   and	  planning	  future	   arrests.	   	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   despite	   cooperation	   at	   the	  highest	  level	  in	  some	  countries,	  other	  powerful	  operatives	  in	  the	  government	  who	  are	  accused	  by	  the	  ICC	  may	  continue	  to	  present	  strong	   obstacles	   to	   its	   effective	   processing.	   	   Thus,	   the	   ICC	  Prosecutor	   recently	   cited	   reports	   that	   Kenyan	   residents	   were	  facing	   “threats,	   intimidation,	   and	   other	   attempts	   to	   discourage	  participation	   in	   [his]	   investigation	  .	  .	  .	   the	  Prosecution	  considers	  that	   currently	   the	   suspects	   [who	   were	   allowed	   to	   remain	   free	  pursuant	  to	  a	  negotiated	  summons]	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  influence	  the	   Government	   of	   Kenya	   policy	   and	   that	   any	   information	  provided	  to	  the	  Kenyan	  authorities	  can	  be	  used	  to	  attack	  victims	  and	   witnesses.”65	   	   He	   noted	   that	   in	   a	   fraud	   trial	   in	   the	   Kenya	  court	   involving	  one	  of	   the	   leaders	   accused	  of	   international	  war	  crimes	  by	  the	  ICC,	  “it	  is	  noteworthy	  that	  five	  witnesses	  slated	  to	  testify	   against	   him	   died	   before	   trial,	   thirteen	   witnesses	  
 
	   64.	   See	  generally	  GERHARD	  WERLE,	  PRINCIPLES	  OF	  INTERNATIONAL	  CRIMINAL	  LAW	  172-­‐78	   (2005)	   (providing	   an	   overview	   of	   principles	   of	   immunity	   under	  international	   law);	   Rosanne	   van	   Alebeek,	   Immunity	   and	   Human	   Rights?:	   A	  
Bifurcated	  Approach,	  104	  AM.	  SOC’Y	  INT’L	  L.	  PROC.	  67,	  70–72	  (2010)	  (addressing	  whether	   immunity	   extends	   to	   “international	   crimes”	   alleged	   in	   domestic	  courts).	  	  Compare	  Arrest	  Warrant	  of	  11	  April	  2000	  (Dem.	  Rep.	  Congo	  v.	  Belg.),	  Judgment,	   2002	   I.C.J.	   3,	   ¶¶	   51,	   53–54	   (Feb.	   14)	   (reviewing	   the	   immunities	  accorded	   under	   customary	   international	   law	   to	  ministers	   for	   foreign	   affairs	  and	  concluding	  that	  “the	   functions	  of	  a	  Minister	   for	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  are	  such	  that,	   throughout	   the	   duration	   of	   his	   or	   her	   office,	   he	   or	   she	   when	   abroad	  enjoys	  full	  immunity	  from	  criminal	  jurisdiction	  and	  inviolability”),	  with	  Rome	  Statute,	   supra	   note	   18,	   art.	   27(1)	   (“This	   Statute	   shall	   apply	   equally	   to	   all	  persons	  without	  any	  distinction	  based	  on	  official	  capacity.”).	  
 65. See Office of the Prosecutor, Int’l Criminal Court, Prosecution Files Response 
re Request for Assistance Kenyan Government – Disclosure Would be 
Unacceptable Risk for Victims and Witnesses, 86 OTP WEEKLY BRIEFING, May 3–
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  and	  could	  not	  be	   located,	  and	  remaining	  witnesses	  who	   survived	   and	   were	   available	   to	   testify	   recanted	   their	  previous	  incriminating	  accounts	  and	  exculpated	  [the	  accused].”66	  	  The	  Prosecutor	  has	  also	  said	  he	  will	  not	  “take	   formal	  evidence”	  pertaining	   to	   the	   Libyan	   warrants	   from	   sources	   inside	   the	  country	   “because	   of	   fears	   that	   they	   would	   suffer	  repercussions.”67	  	  	  	   Additional	  obstacles	  to	  securing	  custody	  of	  an	  accused	   leader	  arise	   when	   the	   country	   is	   at	   war,	   as	   is	   true	   in	   several	   of	   the	  African	  countries	  whose	  situations	  have	  been	  referred	  to	  the	  ICC.	  	  The	   ad	   hoc	   ICTY	   and	   ICTR	   and	   the	   hybrid	   SCSL	   deal	   only	  with	  accused	   in	   the	   aftermath	   of	   civil	   and	   regional	   wars	   already	  finished.	   	  Ongoing	  conflict	  at	  the	  time	  warrants	  are	  issued	  often	  means	   war	   crimes	   are	   still	   being	   committed	   on	   both	   sides,	  thereby	   lowering	   the	   incentive	   of	   either	   side	   to	   cooperate;	  evidence	  is	  also	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  destroyed	  in	  the	  chaos	  of	  war;	  and	  witnesses	  are	  inaccessible.	  	  In	  the	  cases	  of	  Sudan	  and	  Libya,	  the	  Prosecutor	   has	   apparently	   decided	   that	   the	   risk	   of	   harm	   to	  ICC	   personnel	   operating	   physically	   in	   those	   territories	   is	   too	  great.68	   	   As	   a	   result,	   in-­‐country	   “third	   party	   intermediaries,”	  friendly	  native	  individuals,	  and	  private	  groups	  have	  been	  used	  in	  Sudan	  to	  gather	  information,	  causing	  in	  some	  instances	  physical	  risks	  for	  them	  and	  difficulties	  for	  the	  prosecutors	  and	  the	  Court,	  resulting	   from	  defense	   challenges	   to	   their	   objectivity,	   accuracy,	  and	   the	   quality	   of	   their	   supervision.69	  
 
	   66.	   Id.	  
	   67.	   See	   Michael	   Birnbaum,	   Court	   Action	   Increases	   Pressure	   on	   Gaddafi,	  WASH.	  POST,	  May	  17,	  2011,	  at	  A10.	  	  68.	  See	  Julie	  Flint	  &	  Alex	  de	  Waal,	  Case	  Closed:	  	  A	  Prosecutor	  Without	  Borders,	  WORLD	   AFFAIRS	   (Spring	   2009),	  http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/case-­‐closed-­‐prosecutor-­‐without-­‐borders	   (noting	   that,	   when	   criticized	   for	   failing	   to	   conduct	   interviews	   in	  Darfur,	   ICC	   Prosecutor	   Moreno-­‐Ocampo	   responded	   that	   “Darfur	   was	   too	  dangerous	   for	   investigations	   and	   that	   victims	   and	   witnesses	   couldn’t	   be	  protected	   from	   the	   wrath	   of	   the	   Sudan	   government”).	  69.See	   Coal.	   for	   the	   Int’l	   Criminal	   Court,	   Developing	   an	   ICC	   Policy	   on	  
Intermediaries,	  41	  THE	  MONITOR,	  Nov.	  2010–Apr.	  2011,	  at	  9–11	  (describing	  the	  OTP’s	   reliance	   on	   intermediaries	   in	   identifying	   suspects,	   facilitating	   direct	  access	   to	   remote	   regions,	   and	  conducting	  outreach	   to	  victims,	  but	  observing	  that	   intermediaries	   are	   often	   in	   “precarious”	   position	   because	   they	   lack	  official	   status,	   protection,	   and	   material	   support	   and	   they	   are	   subjected	   to	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   Finally,	   apprehension	   of	   ICC	   suspects	   is	   only	   one	   aspect	   of	  most	   countries’	   foreign	   policy	   and	   may	   be	   trumped	   by	   other	  national	   interests	   that	   countermand	   cooperation	   with	   the	   ICC	  and	  militate	   continued	   good	   relations	  with	   the	   resistant	   ruling	  factions	   in	   countries	   harboring	   fugitives.	   	   This	   appears	   to	   have	  happened	   at	   least	   temporarily	   in	   Sudan’s	   case.	   	   The	   perceived	  need	  to	  involve	  Northern	  Sudan	  in	  the	  negotiations	  surrounding	  the	  referendum	  for	  independence	  of	  Southern	  Sudan	  reportedly	  led	   to	   a	   diminution	   of	   efforts	   to	   press	   for	   the	   handover	   of	   Al	  Bashir	   who	   was	   considered	   key	   to	   a	   peaceful	   transition.	   	   As	   a	  result,	   an	   increase	   in	   atrocities	   against	   civilians,	   particularly	  women,	   in	   the	   Darfur	   camps	   has	   been	   reported	   during	   this	  period,	  and,	  ironically,	  new	  atrocities	  attributed	  to	  Bashir	  in	  one	  of	   the	   disputed	   areas	   on	   the	   North/South	   Sudan	   border.70	  	  	   Additionally,	   there	   is	   little	   question	   that	   decisions	   on	   the	  timing	   of	   issuing	   or	   attempting	   to	   enforce	   international	   court	  indictments	   against	   leaders	   can,	   in	   its	   own	   right,	   affect	   global	  politics	   by	   effecting	   the	   leader’s	   presence	   or	   absence	   at	   key	  events,	   such	   as	   peace	   negotiations.	   	   Karadzic’s	   and	   Mladic’s	  indictments	  in	  l995	  kept	  them	  from	  attending	  the	  Dayton	  Peace	  conferences	  where	  they	  were	  expected	  to	  create	  discord;	  on	  the	  other	   hand	   Milosevic’s	   presence	   was	   apparently	   considered	  potentially	  helpful.71	   	  The	  Libyan	  situation,	  discussed	  below,	  has	  
 intimidation).	  	  The	  ICC	  has	  adopted	  draft	  guidelines	  for	  use	  of	  intermediaries.	  	  
Id.	   at	   9;	   see	   also	   id.	   at	   10-­‐11	   (highlighting	   how	   Thomas	   Lubanga’s	   defense	  team	  demanded	   the	  disclosure	  of	   intermediaries’	   identities,	   on	  grounds	   that	  the	   intermediaries	   coached	  witnesses	   and	   fabricated	  evidence,	   but	   that	  OTP	  rejected	  this	  demand).	  
	   70.	   See	   George	   Clooney	   &	   John	   Prendergast,	   Op-­‐Ed.,	   Avoiding	   the	   Next	  
Darfur,	  WASH.	  POST,	  May	  28,	  2011,	  at	  A17	  (noting	  that	  Al	  Bashir	  is	  “escalating	  bombing	  and	  food	  aid	  obstruction	  in	  Darfur	  and	  he	  now	  threatens	  the	  entire	  north-­‐south	   peace	   process”);	   Issue	   #97,	   supra	   note	   6,	   at	   3	   (expressing	   the	  remarks	   of	   civil	   society	   groups	   that	   attacks	   in	   Sudan	   by	   Al	   Bashir	   are	   “an	  unbearable	   example	   of	   the	   threat	   to	   peace	   and	   security	  which	   can	   emanate	  from	   the	   failure	   to	   address	   accountability”	   and	   that	   “execution	   of	   the	  outstanding	  arrest	  warrants	  is	  critical	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  both	  justice	  and	  peace”);	  Eric	  Reeves,	  Op-­‐Ed.,	  Genocide	  Anew	   in	   Sudan?,	  WASH.	   POST,	   June	  18,	   2011,	   at	  A15	  (“Too	  often	  with	  Sudan,	  empty	  demands	  and	  threats	  signal	  to	  the	  regime	  that	  the	  world	  is	  not	  serious	  about	  halting	  atrocities.”).	  	   71.	   See	  Goldston,	  supra	  note	  12	  (finding	  that,	  despite	  initial	  criticism	  of	  the	  indictments	   of	   Karadzic	   and	   Mladic	   prior	   to	   the	   Dayton	   peace	   talks,	   the	  absence	  of	  Karadzic	  and	  Mladic	  “may	  have	  helped	  U.S.	  officials	   find	  common	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  brought	   the	   issue	   into	   bas	   relief.	  	  	   E.	   THE	  ICC	  ON	  THE	  LIBYAN	  BALANCE	  WHEEL	  	  	  	  In	  May	  2011,	  the	  Prosecutor	  of	  the	  ICC	  submitted	  requests	  to	  the	  Pretrial	  Chamber	  for	  arrest	  warrants	  for	  President	  Muammar	  Qaddafi,	  his	  son	  Saif,	  and	  the	  head	  of	  Libyan	  intelligence	  for	  war	  crimes,	   crimes	  against	  humanity,	   and	  genocide	   committed	  after	  February	   15,	   2011.72	   	   The	   warrants	   were	   issued	   shortly	  thereafter.	   His	   request	   came	   within	   weeks	   of	   the	   referral	   in	  Resolution	   1970	   of	   the	   Libyan	   “situation”	   to	   the	   ICC	   from	   a	  unanimous	   fifteen	   member	   UN	   Security	   Council	   pursuant	   to	  Article	   13(b)	   of	   the	   Rome	   Statute.73	   	   It	   was	   reported	   that	   the	  speed	   with	   which	   the	   warrant	   request	   was	   made	   reflected	   a	  purpose	  to	  delegitimize	  the	  Libyan	  ruler’s	  attacks	  on	  the	  civilian	  population	   rising	   against	   him	   and	   to	   attract	   defectors	   from	   his	  government	   and	   army.74	   	   The	   warrants	   were	   applauded	   and	  enforcement	  cooperation	  was	  promised	  by	  virtually	  all	  Western	  and	   some	   African	   countries	   (the	   United	   Kingdom,	   Denmark,	  France,	  Australia,	  Germany,	  Canada,	  Portugal,	  Nigeria,	   Lebanon,	  the	   European	   Union,	   Russia,	   and	   China).75	   	   The	   African	   Union,	  however,	  denounced	   the	   ICC	  action	  as	   “discriminatory,”	   told	   its	  
 ground	  among	  Bosniaks,	  Croats,	  and	  Serbs”).	  
	   72.	   See	   Press	   Release,	   Coal.	   for	   the	   Int’l	   Criminal	   Court,	   ICC	   Prosecutor	  Requests	   Arrest	   Warrants	   Against	   Muammar	   al-­‐Gadaffi,	   Saif	   al-­‐Islam	   and	  Abdullah	   al-­‐Sanusi	   (May	   16,	   2011),	   available	   at	   http://www.iccnow.org/	  documents/Libya_Warrants_CICC_MA_FINAL_16052011.pdf.	  
	   73.	   Id.;	   see	  also	   Rome	   Statute,	   supra	   note	   18,	   art.	   15	   (permitting	   the	   ICC	  Prosecutor	  to	  examine	  situations	  referred	  to	  the	  ICC).	  
	   74.	   See	   Ellis,	   supra	   note	  11	   (explaining	   that	   the	   indictment	  was	   complete	  within	   four	  months	  because	   the	  prosecutor	   “was	   seeking	   to	   send	  a	  message	  that	  accountability	  should	  trump	  impunity.”).	  
	   75.	   See	  Prosecution	  Files	  Response,	  supra	  note	  65,	  at	  2	   (reporting	   that	   “all	  fifteen	   member	   States	   expressed	   their	   support	   to	   the	   work	   of	   the	   Court”);	  Office	  of	  the	  Prosecutor,	  Int’l	  Criminal	  Court,	  OTP	  Requests	  Arrest	  Warrants	  in	  
Libya	  Situation,	  87	  OTP	  WEEKLY	  BRIEFING,	  May	  11–16,	  2011,	  at	  2	   [hereinafter	  
Issue	   #	   87],	   available	   at	   http://www.icc-­‐cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/3836B9AF-­‐B0DC-­‐4F94-­‐A4A8-­‐4115E95AE76E/	  283329/	  OTPWeeklyBriefing_1116May201187.pdf	   (relaying	   statements	   of	   support	  from	   various	   States);	   Situation	   in	   the	   CAR,	   supra	   note	   9,	   at	   2	   (describing	  Libya’s	  Interim	  National	  Council’s	  commitment	  to	  enforcing	  arrest	  warrants).	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  members	   to	   disregard	   the	   warrants,	   and	   later	   petitioned	   the	  Security	  Council	  to	  defer	  the	  ICC	  investigation.76	  	  Qaddafi	  quickly	  announced	  that	  he	  had	  no	  intention	  of	  honoring	  the	  warrant,	  his	  representative	  calling	   the	  court	   “an	  organization	  clearly	   formed	  to	   prosecute	   people	   from	   the	   Third	   World.”77	   	   Press	   reports	  commented	   on	   the	   risk	   of	   “such	   a	   politically	   sensitive	  prosecution	   in	   the	  midst	  of	   an	  armed	  conflict,”	  worrying	   that	   it	  would	   “complicate	   efforts	   to	   get	   Gaddafi	   to	   step	   down.”78	  	  Concern	  was	   also	   expressed	   that	   the	  possibility	   of	   a	  negotiated	  exile	  might	  be	  more	  effective	  to	  stop	  the	  slaughter.	  	  According	  to	  one,	   the	  warrant	   gave	  him	   “a	  powerful	   incentive	   to	   fight	   to	   the	  death,	   greatly	   prolonging	  what	   could	   have	   been	   a	   short	  war.”79	  	  Indeed,	   before	   the	   warrants	   were	   issued	   there	   were	   reports	  Western	  and	  African	  countries	  were	  reconnoitering	  for	  a	  country	  who	   was	   not	   a	   party	   to	   the	   Rome	   Statute,	   which	   would	   grant	  Qaddafi	  a	   safe	  haven,	  and	  one	  report	   surfaced	   that	  U.S.	  officials	  asked	   Russia	   to	   find	   such	   a	   country	   and	   Russia	   replied	   that	   it	  could.80	   	   The	   OTP,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   was	   adamantly	   insisting	  that	   any	   new	   government	   in	   Libya	   “would	   be	   obliged	   to	   arrest	  him”81	   and	   the	   rebel	   leaders	  at	   first	   indicated	   they	  would	  bring	  
 
	   76.	   African	  Union	  Opposes	  Warrant	  for	  Qaddafi,	  N.Y.	  TIMES,	  July	  3,	  2011,	  at	  A10.	  	   77.	   Colum	   Lynch,	   International	   Court	   Issues	   Warrant	   for	   Gaddafi,	   Aides,	  WASH.	  POST,	  June	  28,	  2011,	  at	  A9.	  
	   78.	   Id.	  
	   79.	   See	  Jackson	  Diehl,	  After	  the	  Dictators	  Fall	  .	  .	  .,	  WASH.	  POST,	  June	  6,	  2011,	  at	  A17	  (noting	  that	  “the	  more	  immediate	  and	  uncompromising	  the	  justice	  for	  a	   dictator,	   the	  worse	   it	   is	   for	   the	   post–revolution	   regime”);	   see	  also	   Richard	  Cohen,	  Who	  Will	  Take	  in	  Mubarak	  and	  Gaddafi?,	  WASH.	  POST,	  Aug.	  12,	  2011,	  at	  A17	  (arguing	  that	  “it	  would	  be	  best	  for	  everyone	  involved	  if	  some	  government	  simply	   offered	   [Gaddafi	   or	   Bashar	   al-­‐Assad]	   sanctuary”);	   William	   C.	  Goodfellow,	  A	  St.	  Helena	  Home	  for	  Gaddafi?,	  WASH.	  POST,	   June	  3,	  2011,	  at	  A17	  (speculating	   about	   the	   cost	   of	   issuing	   an	   arrest	   warrant	   for	   Gaddafi	   and	  observing	  that	  President	  Obama	  wished	  to	  “avoid	  a	  repeat”	  of	  the	  unnecessary	  bloodshed	  in	  Ivory	  Coast).	  
	   80.	   See	  Ellen	  Barry,	  In	  Diplomatic	  Reversal,	  Russia	  Offers	  to	  Try	  to	  Persuade	  
Qaddafi	  to	  Leave	  Power,	  N.Y.	  TIMES,	  May	  28,	  2011,	  at	  A10	  (describing	  Russia’s	  effort	  to	  use	  its	  leverage	  to	  persuade	  Qaddafi	  to	  leave	  office);	  see	  also	  David	  E.	  Sanger	  &	  Eric	  Schmitt,	  U.S.	  and	  Allies	  Seek	  a	  Refuge	  for	  Qaddafi,	  N.Y.	  TIMES,	  Apr.	  17,	   2011,	   at	   A1	   (reporting	   that	   the	   Obama	   administration	   and	   the	   African	  Union	   searched	   for	   a	   country	   that	   has	  no	   ICC	  obligation	   that	  would	  provide	  shelter	  to	  Qaddafi	  in	  the	  event	  he	  was	  removed	  from	  power).	  
	   81.	   See	  Issue	  #97,	  supra	  note	  6,	  at	  3.	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  him	  before	  the	  ICC.82	  	  Once	  the	  warrants	  were	  issued,	  reports	  of	  inquiries	   about	   possible	   exile	   disappeared,	   Qaddafi	   fought	   on,	  although	   the	  debate	  on	   the	  wisdom	  and	   timing	  of	   the	  warrants	  continued.	  	  	  	  	   The	   OTP	   did	   announce	   that	   while	   it	   was	   calling	   for	   full	  cooperation	  with	   its	   investigation,	   the	  Court	  was	  not	  asking	   for	  international	   forces	   operating	   under	   the	   Security	   Council	  Resolution	  1973	  to	  implement	  the	  arrests.83	  	  Instead,	  it	  was	  up	  to	  the	   interim	   government	   in	   Libya	   (NTC)	   to	   make	   the	   arrests.84	  	  More	   recently,	   the	   Libyan	   government	   has	   been	   reported	   as	  saying	   it	   intends	   to	   bring	   Qaddafi	   to	   trial	   in	   its	   own	   courts,	  consistent	  with	  international	  justice	  standards,85	  though	  whether	  
 
	   82.	   See	   Office	   of	   the	   Prosecutor,	   Int’l Criminal Court, Kenya, 93 OTP 
WEEKLY BRIEFING, June 21–27, 2011, at 3, available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/ rdonlyres/341D49AF-6BDB-4920-8C00-
83878BC19C3E/283532/OTPWeeklyBriefing_2127June2011.pdf	   (explaining	  that	  Mohamed	  Al	  Alagi,	   the	  Justice	  Minister	  for	  the	  Interim	  National	  Council-­‐Libya	  expressed	  that	  the	  INC	  would	  fully	  cooperate).	  
	   83.	   Id.	   (recognizing	   that	   Resolution	   1973	   had	   “no	   specific	   mandate	   [for	  international	   forces]	   to	   implement	   arrest	   warrants”	   and	   instead	   Libya	   was	  primarily	  responsible	  for	  making	  such	  arrests).	  
	   84.	   Id.	  If	  the	  interim	  transitional	  Libyan	  group	  government	  (NTC)	  persists	  in	   its	   determination	   to	   try	   Qaddafi	   in	   national	   courts,	   it	   must	   confront	   the	  disastrous	   experience	   of	   the	   Iraqi	   trial	   and	   execution	   of	   Saddam	   Hussein,	  which	   despite	   substantial	   behind	   the	   scenes	   American	   assistance	   got	  generally	   bad	  marks	   for	   politization,	   inability	   to	  maintain	   order	   and	   letting	  the	  defendants	   take	  control	  of	   the	  courtroom.	  The	   ICC,	   the	  UN,	  and	  Western	  leaders	  generally	  would	  not	  provide	  assistance	  because	  the	  death	  penalty	  was	  on	   the	   table.	  See	  generally,	  e.g.,	  MICHAEL	  NEWTON	  &	  MICHAEL	  SCHARF,	  ENEMY	  OF	  THE	   STATE:	   THE	   TRIAL	   AND	   EXECUTION	   OF	   SADDAM	   HUSSEIN	   (2008);	   PATRICIA	   M.	  WALD,	  TYRANTS	  ON	  TRIAL:	  KEEPING	  ORDER	  IN	  THE	  COURTROOM	  (2009).	  Egypt’s	  post	  conflict	   government	   also	   decided	   to	   bring	   its	   former	   President	   Mubarek	   to	  trial	   in	  a	  national	   court	   soon	  after	  he	   stepped	  down.	  But	  assessments	  of	   the	  wisdom	   of	   that	   effort	   are	  mixed.	   See	   Editorial,	  Egypt’s	   Revolutionary	   Justice,	  WASH.	  POST,	  June	  4,	  2011,	  at	  A12	  (stating	  that	  the	  trials	  of	  Mubarak	  and	  former	  ministers	   lack	   independent	   judges,	   lack	   sufficient	   evidence,	   and	   are	   too	  rushed);	  see	  also	  Anthony	  Faiola,	  Mubarak	  Trial	  Comes	  to	  a	  Halt,	  WASH.	  POST,	  Sept.	  25,	  2011,	  at	  A13	  (stating	  that	  the	  victims’	  lawyers	  in	  Mubarak’s	  trial	  lost	  faith	  in	  impartiality	  of	  judges	  and	  moved	  to	  have	  new	  judges	  appointed).	  
	   85.	   See	   Karen	   DeYoung	   &	   Leila	   Fadel,	   Obama	   Asks	   Libya’s	   Neighbors	   to	  
Arrest	  Fugitive	  Loyalists,	  WASH.	  POST,	  Sept.	  7,	  2011,	  at	  A10	  (explaining	  that	  the	  United	   States	   has	   been	   encouraging	   states	   neighboring	   Libya	   to	   arrest	   high	  level	   Qaddafi	   loyalists	   fleeing	   over	   their	   borders,	   some	   of	   whom	   may	   be	  “under	  indictment	  by	  the	  International	  Criminal	  Court.”).	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  that	   includes	   seeking	   the	   death	   penalty	   is	   unclear.	  	  	   F.	   THE	  PATH	  FORWARD	  	  The	   ICC,	   as	   well	   as	   its	   supporters	   and	   detractors	   alike,	  recognize	   that	   the	   expeditious	   handover	   of	   its	   accused,	  particularly	   its	   most	   notorious	   high-­‐level	   defendants,	   is	   still	   a	  substantial	   hurdle	   to	   its	   credibility.	   	   Yet	   for	   all	   the	   reasons	  discussed,	   such	   captures	   often	   involve	   thorny	   political	   and	  diplomatic	   considerations	   not	   encountered	   in	   national	  prosecutions.	   	   But	   are	   there	   further	   steps	   that	   might	   improve	  their	  record,	  especially	  the	  ICC’s,	  since	  most	  of	  the	  other	  ad	  hoc	  courts	   are	   either	   in	   an	   exit	   strategy	   or	   have	   secured	   all	   their	  indicated	  suspects?	  In	  June	  2010,	  the	  ten-­‐year	  review	  of	  the	  ICC	  by	  the	  Assembly	  of	  State	   Parties	   (“ASP”)	   at	  Kampala	   featured	   a	   “stocktaking”	   of	   its	  operations	   that	   included	   a	   focus	   on	   apprehension	   of	   suspects	  and	   the	   cooperation	   of	   States	   Parties	   in	   that	   endeavor.86	  	  Preparatory	   work	   was	   done	   for	   the	   meetings	   by	   a	   Hague	  Working	   Group	   and	   culminated	   in	   a	   renewed	   declaration	   of	  cooperation	   adopted	   by	   the	   Court’s	   governing	   body,	   the	   ASP,	  which	  undertook	   to	  monitor	  and	  oversee	  cooperation	  under	   its	  authority	   in	   Article	   112	   of	   the	   Rome	   statute.87	   	   Cooperation	   by	  ASP	   members	   was	   made	   a	   standing	   item	   on	   the	   permanent	  agenda	   of	   regularly	   scheduled	   ASP	   meetings;	   a	   facilitator	   for	  cooperation	  was	   appointed	   to	   keep	   track	   of	   developments	   and	  problems,	   and	   to	   arrange	   for	   the	   exchange	   of	   best	   practices	   in	  cooperation,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  assure	  political	  and	  diplomatic	  support	  for	   the	   Court	   in	   related	   UN	   activities.	   	   Individual	   countries	  pledged	   to	  cooperate	   in	  enforcing	   ICC	   judgments	  and	  decisions,	  
 
	   86.	   See	   Increasing	  Global	  Commitment	   to	  Complementarity,	   supra	  note	  44,	  at	  6-­‐8.	  
	   87.	   See	   Coal.	   for	   the	   Int’l	   Criminal	   Court,	   ICC	   Review	   Conference:	   Global	  
Coalition	  Calls	  on	  States	  to	  Honor	  Kampala	  Commitments	  to	  Cooperate	  with	  the	  
ICC,	   41	   THE	   MONITOR,	   Nov.	   2010–Apr.	   2011,	   at	   1,	   8–9	   (discussing	   the	  Declaration	   on	   Cooperation	   adopted	   by	   the	   ASP	   and	   emphasizing	   further	  steps	  necessary	   to	  address	  non-­‐compliance	  pursuant	   to	  Article	  112(f)	  of	   the	  Rome	  Statute);	  see	  also	  Rome	  Statute,	  supra	  note	  17,	  art.	  112.	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  to	   adopt	   the	   implementing	   legislation	   necessary	   for	   such	  cooperation,	   and	   to	   pursue	   bilateral	   and	   regional	   assistance	  agreements	  for	  such	  cooperation.	  	  This	  renewed	  commitment	  to	  cooperation	   took	   place	   two	   years	   ago	   and	   it	   may	   be	   early	   to	  assess	  its	  effect,	  though	  there	  have	  been	  no	  arrests	  of	  high	  level	  defendants	  such	  as	  Al	  Bashir	  or	  Joseph	  Kony	  since	  then.	  	  The	  ASP	  also	   said	   it	   would	   consider	   how	   better	   to	   enforce	   the	   Rome	  Statute’s	   authorization	   for	   sanctions	   against	   noncooperation	  reported	  by	  the	  Court	  to	  the	  ASP.88	  	  According	  to	  a	  2010	  Update	  Report,	  the	  Prosecutor	  has	  issued	  new	  guidelines	  for	  cooperation	  that	   stress	   eliminating	   nonessential	   contacts	   with	   an	   arrest	  subject,	   expressions	   of	   support	   for	   arrests	   in	   bilateral	   and	  multilateral	   meetings,	   taking	   steps	   to	   prevent	   diversion	   of	  humanitarian	   funds	   to	   benefit	   arrest	   subjects,	   and	   providing	  financial	  help	  to	  other	  countries	  to	  plan	  and	  execute	  arrests.89	  	  All	  of	  these	  steps	  are	  useful	  but	  conventional	  tries	  at	  getting	  better	  results	   in	   the	   hardest	   cases.	   	   However,	   two	   additional	  suggestions	   deserve	   consideration.	  First,	   the	   ICC	  Prosecutor	  should	   look	   internally	  at	  his	  operation	  to	  see	  if	  experience	  militates	  toward	  a	  more	  measured	  approach	  in	  deciding	  on	  the	  timing	  of	  warrants.	   	  One	  seasoned	  veteran	  of	  both	   the	   ad	   hoc	   and	   ICC	   courts	   opines	   that	   the	   OTP	   has	   not	  always	  had	  a	  “sustainable	   long-­‐term	  strategy”	  for	  apprehending	  high	   level	   defendants	   other	   than	   exhortations	   to	   others	   to	  cooperate;	   it	  has	  proceeded	  opportunistically.90	   	  The	  Prosecutor	  of	  course	  would	  deny	  this	  and	  point	  to	  his	  public	  caution	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Libya:	  “arrests	  cannot	  be	  successfully	  conducted	  without	  serious	   planning	   and	   preparation,	   which	   takes	   time.	   The	  international	  community	  should	  take	  steps	  now	  to	  assist	  on	  such	  
 
	   88.	   See	  Coal.	   for	   the	  Int’l	  Criminal	  Court,	  42	  THE	  MONITOR,	  May–Oct.	  2011,	  at	   7	   (explaining	   that	   the	   ASP	   passed	   a	   resolution	   titled	   “Strengthening	   the	  International	   Criminal	   Court	   and	   the	   ASP”	   concerning	   procedures	   aimed	   at	  dealing	  with	  incidents	  of	  non-­‐cooperation).	  
	   89.	   See	  Int’l	  Criminal	  Court	  [ICC],	  Review	  Conference	  to	  the	  Rome	  Statute,	  May	   31–June	   11,	   2010,	  Report	   of	   the	   Court	   on	   Cooperation:	   Update,	   ¶	   6,	   ICC	  Doc.	   RC/2	   (May	   11,	   2010);	   see	   also	   Kenya	   Report,	   supra	   note	   38,	   at	   3	  (explaining	  that	  thirty-­‐nine	  human	  rights	  organizations	  urged	  greater	  efforts	  to	  execute	  the	  arrest	  warrant	  for	  Kony	  and	  other	  LRA	  leaders).	  	   90.	   Memorandum	  from	  Stefanie	  Frease	  to	  Author	  (Jan.	  11,	  2011).	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  practical	  planning.”91	  	  But	  it	  was	  not	  clear	  what	  others	  should	  do	  since	   he	   was	   equally	   clear	   that	   Libyan	   authorities	   had	   the	  primary	  responsibility	  to	  make	  the	  arrests:	  “Libyans	  will	  lead.”92	  	  Admittedly,	   in	   Libya’s	   case	   the	   unanimous	   Security	   Council	  referral	   in	   addition	   to	   global	  outrage	  at	  Qaddafi’s	   atrocities	  put	  unusual	   pressure	   on	   the	   Prosecutor	   to	   act.	   	   But	   even	   in	   such	  crisis	   situations	   he	   must	   take	   account	   of	   the	   reality	   that	   the	  warrant	   is	   like	  crossing	  the	  Rubicon—it	  cuts	  off	  access	  to	  other	  avenues	   of	   diplomacy	   for	   resolving	   the	   crisis	   inspired	   by	   the	  leader’s	   presence.	   	   When	   it	   enters	   an	   ongoing	   furious	   conflict	  both	  the	  Prosecutor	  and	  the	  Court	  must	  be	  careful	  to	  preserve	  its	  nonpolitical	  image	  and	  not	  appear	  to	  be	  reacting	  or	  contributing	  to	  political	  or	  military	  strategies.93	  	  In	   less	   pressured	   cases	   than	   Libya,	   the	   ICC’s	   issuance	   of	  warrants,	   and	   more	   specifically	   the	   timing	   of	   their	   issuance,	  needs	   to	   account	   for	   the	   likelihood	   of	   apprehension	   within	   a	  reasonable	  time	  and	  a	  specific	  plan	  for	  bringing	  it	  about.	   	  These	  are	  difficult	  balancing	  decisions	  to	  make.	   	  Watching	  and	  waiting	  for	  the	  right	  moment	  to	  issue	  a	  request	  for	  a	  warrant	  may	  invite	  outside	   criticism	   for	   “dawdling.”	   	   Thus,	   the	   ICC	   was	   criticized	  first	   in	   the	   Darfur	   case	   for	   seeking	   warrants	   for	   Al	   Bashir’s	  subordinates	   and	   not	   going	   after	   Al	   Bashir	   but	   when	   the	  Prosecutor	   subsequently	   obtained	   a	   warrant	   against	   Al	   Bashir,	  he	  was	  further	  criticized	  for	  not	  taking	  account	  of	  the	  barriers	  to	  arresting	  him.	  	  ICC	  supporters	  as	  well	  as	  critics	  can	  be	  fickle	  and	  given	   to	   exhortations	   in	   lieu	   of	   positive	   aid,	   and	   their	   urgings	  should	   not	   dominate	   the	   Prosecutor’s	   decisions	   on	   warrants.	  	  The	   OTP	   needs	   staff	   that	   is	   politically	   astute	   and	   able	   to	   build	  
 	   91.	   Office	   of	   the	   Prosecutor,	   Int’l	   Criminal	   Court,	   Statement	   to	   the	  United	  
Nations	   Security	   Council	   on	   the	   situation	   in	   the	   Libyan	   Arab	   Jamahiriya,	  
pursuant	   to	   UNSCR	   1970	   ¶	   26	   (2011),	   available	   at	   http://www.icc-­‐cpi.int/Menus/ICC/	  Situations+and+Cases/Situations/ICC0111/Reports+to+the+UNSC/.	  
	   92.	   Issue	  #	  97,	  	  supra	  note	  6,	  at	  1.	  
	   93.	   See	   Ellis,	   supra	   note	   11	   (“Since	   its	   inception,	   the	   court	   has	   generated	  more	  than	  two	  dozen	  indictments	  and	  sowed	  no	  small	  amount	  of	  diplomatic	  discord	   .	   .	   .	  Unfortunately,	  contradictions	  and	  competing	  agendas	  undermine	  the	   credibility	   and	   effectiveness	   of	   prosecutors	   and	   diplomats	   alike	   .	   .	   .	  [D]iplomats	   and	   judicial	   authorities	   need	   to	   start	   looking	   for	   points	   of	  coordination	   .	   .	   .	   [and]	   to	   begin	   exploring	   common	   ground	   for	   the	   common	  good.”).	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   and	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   governments,	   NGOs,	   and	  journalists.	  	  It	  also	  needs	  seasoned	  investigators	  and	  prosecutors	  to	  provide	  the	  necessary	  technical	  and	  intelligence	  guidance	  and	  the	  ability	   to	   assess	  acceptable	   limits	  of	   risk	   to	  achieve	  desired	  results.	   	   Advanced	   military	   technology	   developed	   in	   the	  campaigns	   against	   terrorists	   offer	   an	   enticing	   promise.	  	  According	   to	   newspaper	   reports	   they	   include	   a	   body	   of	  “targeters”	  who	  collect	  data	  from	  multiple	  sources	  and	  pinpoint	  the	  location	  of	  their	  targets	  in	  faraway	  places.	  94	  	  The	  results	  are	  not	  only	  used	  for	  drones	  or	  “taking	  out”	  the	  subjects	  but	  also	  for	  arranging	  their	  capture.	   	  Admittedly,	  the	  United	  States	  is	  not	  an	  ICC	  member	  but	   is	   it	   ridiculous	   to	   think	   that	  some	  constructive	  dialogue	   can	   be	   had	   with	   their	   experts	   so	   as	   to	   improve	   the	  Court’s	  searches	  for	  warrant	  subjects?	  	  This	  is	  surely	  a	  challenge	  for	   a	   new	   prosecutor	   slated	   to	   take	   over	   in	   the	   next	   year.	  	  	  	   Second,	  with	  the	  success	  of	  the	  foray	  by	  the	  U.S.	  Navy	  SEALs	  in	  Pakistan	  to	  “take	  out”	  Bin	  Laden,	  sentiment	   is	  sure	  to	  resurface	  for	  an	   international	   force	   to	  apprehend	   ICC	  suspects.	   	  This	   idea	  has	   been	   the	   subject	   of	   interest	   in	   the	   past	   but	   apart	   from	  UN	  peacekeeping	   forces	   assisting	   at	   some	   level	   in	   post-­‐Dayton	  Bosnian	   arrests	   and	   UN	   forces	   in	   Uganda,	   the	   problem	   of	  overcoming	   strong	   nationalist	   feelings	   about	   foreign	   enforcers	  invading	  a	   country	  has	  prevented	   its	   translation	   into	  a	   tangible	  plan.	   	   Nonetheless,	   the	   concept	   of	   an	   international	   force	  composed	   of	   skilled	   enforcement	   personnel	   from	   several	   ASP	  countries	  (and	  others	  who	  would	  join)	  who	  agree	  to	  recognize	  its	  authority	   to	  make	  arrests	  under	  accepted	  procedures	   is	  worthy	  of	  continued	  effort	  and	  it	  appears	  that	  such	  a	  project	  may	  be	   in	  progress.	   	   New	   York	   Times	   columnist	   Nicholas	   Kristof	   has	  suggested	  that	  rebel	  or	  populist	  forces	  along	  with	  their	  allies	  in	  a	  conflict	   could	   do	   a	   similar	  maneuver.	   	   “It	   would	   be	   a	   fine	   step	  toward	  ending	  global	   impunity	   for	  atrocities	   if	   a	  SWAT	   team	  of	  Libyans	  and	  coalition	   forces	  swooped	  down	  one	  day	  and	  seized	  Colonel	  Qaddafi	  to	  face	  trial	  in	  The	  Hague.	  .	  .	  .	  [I]t’s	  an	  ending	  that	  
 
	   94.	   See	  Greg	  Miller	  &	  Julie	  Tate,	  Since	  Sept.	  11,	  CIA’s	  Focus	  has	  Taken	  Lethal	  
Turn,	  WASH.	  POST,	  Sept.	  2,	  2011,	  at	  A1.	  	  Of	  course,	  since	  the	  United	  States	  is	  not	  a	  State	  Party	  to	  the	  ICC,	   its	   intelligence	  know-­‐how	  is	  not	  usually	  available	  to	  the	   ICC	   although	   more	   congenial	   relations	   have	   evolved	   to	   allow	   for	   some	  exchanges	  at	  the	  United	  States’	  discretion.	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  would	   leave	  this	  Libyan	   incursion	  remembered	  not	  only	   for	   the	  lives	   it	   saved,	   but	   also	   as	   a	   milestone	   in	   the	   history	   of	  humanitarianism.”95	   	   It	   is	   too	   late	   for	   Libya,	   but	   an	   interesting	  thought	   for	   the	   future.96	  	   CONCLUSION	  	  	  	  	   The	  ICC	  is	  being	  asked	  by	  States	  and	  the	  UN	  Security	  Council	  to	  take	  up	  more	  cases	  of	   long	  entrenched	  dictators	   facing	  popular	  revolts	   and	   to	   try	   them	   for	   past	   atrocities	   and	   crimes	   against	  humanity.97	   Qaddafi,	   now	   deceased,	   and	   Laurent	   Ghagbo,	   the	  recently	   deposed	   president	   of	   the	   Ivory	   Coast,	   are	   examples.	  	  These	   cases	   raise	   anew	   the	   tension	   between	   cooperation	   with	  the	   ICC	   in	   making	   arrests	   and	   other	   national	   interests,	   of	  requested	   cooperators	   in	   ending	   conflict	   and	   saving	   lives.	   	   One	  commentator	  has	  advised	  that	  the	  diplomats	  and	  the	  jurists	  must	  find	  common	  cause	  in	  the	  endeavor	  to	  do	  justice	  and	  save	  lives,	  but	   the	  outlines	  of	   that	  kind	  of	   cooperative	  venture	  have	  yet	   to	  be	   sketched.	   	   As	   the	   ICC	   enters	   its	   second	   decade,	   it	   remains	  critical	   that	   its	   credibility	  as	  not	   just	  a	   fair	  but	  also	  an	  effective	  mechanism	   for	   bringing	   the	   most	   notorious	   violators	   of	  international	  humanitarian	   law	  to	   justice	  not	  be	   impugned	  by	  a	  string	  of	  unexecuted	  warrants.98	  	  The	  ASP’s	  heightened	  attention	  
 	   95.	   Nicholas	  D.	  Kristof,	  Op-­‐Ed.,	  Is	  it	  Better	  to	  Save	  No	  One?,	  N.Y.	  TIMES,	  Apr.	  3,	  2011,	  at	  12.	  
96 . The most thoughtful discussion of what such an international force would 
require and options for its structure is to be found in RICHARD COOPER & JULIETTE 
KOHLER, The Case for an International Marshals Service, in RESPONSIBILITY TO 
PROTECT ch. 14 (2009). 
	   97.	   See,	  e.g.,	  Robert	  Park,	  Editorial,	  The	  Forgotten	  Genocide	  in	  North	  Korea,	  WASH.	  POST,	  Apr.	  21,	  2011,	  at	  A17	  (estimating	  that	  one	  million	  North	  Koreans	  have	  been	  killed	  in	  “political	  concentration	  camps	  since	  1972”).	  	  Hybrid	  courts	  have	   similar	   problems.	   See	   David	   M.	   Crane	   &	   Carla	   Del	   Ponte,	   Editorial,	  
Bringing	   Hariri’s	   Killers	   to	   Justice,	   WASH.	   POST,	   Aug.	   17,	   2011,	   at	   A13	  (describing	   the	   UN	   mandated	   court	   to	   investigate	   and	   prosecute	   killers	   of	  former	   Lebanese	   president;	   prior	   Lebanese	   coalition	   government	   collapsed	  when	   it	   supported	   tribunal,	   indictments	   implicate	   Hezbellah	   members;	  predicted	  impotence	  of	  court	  to	  serve	  indictments	  or	  make	  arrests).	  
	   98.	   The	   International	   Criminal	   Court	   Bares	   Its	   Teeth,	   ECONOMIST,	   May	   14,	  2011,	   at	   57,	   available	   at	   	   http://www.economist.com/node/18682044	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  to	  the	  problem	  coupled	  with	  a	  feasible	  plan	  for	  an	  international	  marshal	  force	  and	  ideally	  some	  transfer	  of	  technological	  locating	  advances	   from	   Islamic	   terrorism	   to	   apprehension	   of	   national	  leader	  terrorists	  could	  advance	  the	  cause.	  	  But	  a	  new	  Prosecutor	  and	   the	   Court	   may	   have	   to	   look	   inward	   at	   their	   criteria	   for	  issuing	   arrest	   warrants	   to	   increase	   the	   likelihood	   of	   their	  execution	   within	   a	   reasonable	   timeframe	   and	   fashion	   their	  requests	  for	  cooperation	  from	  other	  countries	  and	  international	  institutions	  in	  more	  specific	  and	  coordinated	  ways.	  	  SUPPLEMENT	  This	  essay	  was	  based	  upon	  a	  panel	  presentation	  at	  American	  University	  Washington	  College	  of	  Law	  in	  February	  2011	  and	  was	  submitted	  for	  publication	  over	  a	  year	  ago.	  	  Since	  that	  time,	  there	  have	  been	  many	  developments	   in	   cases	   and	   situations	   referred	  to	   therein.	   	   This	   supplement	   mentions	   several	   of	   the	   most	  significant	  ones;	  in	  the	  author’s	  opinion	  none	  of	  the	  main	  issues	  presented	  have	  changed	  dramatically.	  The	   trial	   of	   former	   Egyptian	   President	   Hosni	   Mubarek	  continued	  to	  be	  viewed	  by	  the	  international	  press	  as	  a	  “travesty”	  and	   a	   “hasty,	   politicized	   circus”	   without	   adequate	   proof	   of	   his	  guilt	  and	  inadequate	  time	  for	  his	  defense.	   	  He	  was	  sentenced	  to	  life	   in	  prison	  and	   is	  reportedly	   ill,	   though	  his	   trial	  was	   followed	  by	  protests	  that	  he	  was	  let	  off	  too	  easily.99	  Joseph	   Kony,	   the	   notorious	   LRA	   warlord	   continues	   on	   his	  murderous	  rampage	  in	  the	  Congo.	   	  President	  Obama	  authorized	  100	  troops	  to	  assist	  the	  Congolese	  army	  in	  his	  pursuit.	   	  A	  video	  entitled	  “Kony	  2012”	  depicting	  his	  crimes	  against	  children	  went	  viral	   and	   was	   viewed	   by	   an	   estimated	   112	   million	   people	  worldwide.100	  
 (stating	   that	   “[t]he	   ICC’s	  big	  weakness,	   apart	   from	   its	   astronomical	   cost	   and	  drawn-­‐out	  procedures,	  is	  its	  dependence	  on	  others	  to	  help	  arrest	  suspects”).	  
	   99.	   No	  Justice	  for	  Mr.	  Mubarak:	  The	  trial	  of	  Egypt’s	  former	  ruler	  is	  a	  travesty,	  WASH.	  POST,	  Jan.	  20,	  2012,	  at	  A18;	  Mubarak’s	  Trial,	  WALL	  ST.	  J.,	  June	  4,	  2012,	  at	  A16.	  	   100.	   Paul	  Farhi	  &	  Elizabeth	  Flock,	  Invisible	  Children’s	  ‘Kony	  2012’	  Video	  Goes	  
Viral	   —	   But	   What	   Does	   this	   Mean?,	   WASH. POST, 
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  Bosco	   Ntaganda,	   another	   rogue	   rebel	   leader	   in	   the	   DRC	  indicted	  by	   the	   ICC,	  deserted	   the	  DRC	   forces	   in	  April	  2012,	  and	  remnants	   of	   his	   former	   army	  are	   terrorizing	   the	   region.	   	   Then-­‐Chief	   Prosecutor	   Ocampo	   declared	   “six	   years	   after	   the	   arrest	  warrant	   was	   issued,	   he	   is	   still	   at	   large,	   reportedly	   committing	  acts	   of	   violence	   against	   civilian	   populations.”	   142	   local	   and	  international	   non-­‐governmental	   organizations	   (“NGOs”)	   called	  for	   his	   arrest.	   	   The	   ICC	   issued	   a	   new	   warrant	   for	   Ntaganda	  charging	   additional	   crimes	   against	   humanity	   and	   war	   crimes	  including	  murder,	  rape,	  sexual	  slavery,	  and	  pillage	  in	  the	  DRC.101	  Al	   Bashir,	   the	   Sudanese	   President,	   indicted	   by	   the	   ICC	   for	  genocide	  and	  crimes	  against	  humanity,	  and	  his	  indicted	  minister	  Al-­‐Haroun	   continued	   to	   cause	   trouble	  not	  only	   in	  Darfur	  but	   in	  the	   border	   Nuba	   region	   bordering	   recently	   liberated	   South	  Sudan.	  	  Haroun	  has	  been	  appointed	  by	  Al-­‐Bashir	  as	  the	  governor	  of	  a	  key	  border	  province.	   	  A	  Kenyan	  court	   issued	  a	  warrant	   for	  Al-­‐Bashir’s	   arrest	   should	   he	   revisit	   that	   country	   and	   Germany	  threatened	  to	  boycott	  a	  Qatar	  conference	  if	  he	  attended.	  	  Seventy	  genocide	   scholars	   urged	   President	   Obama	   to	   cut	   off	   aid	   to	  countries	   that	   hosted	   Al	   Bashir	   and	   the	   U.S.	   House	  Appropriations	  Committee	  adopted	  an	  amendment,	  opposed	  by	  the	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  State,	  to	  suspend	  non-­‐humanitarian	  aid	  to	  countries	   welcoming	   Bashir.	   	   Malawi	   announced	   that	   it	   would	  not	  allow	  him	  to	  attend	  an	  African	  Union	  summit	  it	  was	  hosting;	  the	  African	  Union	  objected,	  Malawi	  cancelled	  the	  summit,	  and	  it	  was	  moved	  to	  Addis	  Ababa.	  	  102	  
 http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/invisible-­‐childrens-­‐kony-­‐2012-­‐video-­‐goes-­‐viral-­‐-­‐but-­‐what-­‐does-­‐this-­‐mean/2012/03/09/gIQADMhF2R_story_1.html	  	   101.	   Office	  of	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  OTP	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   Nicholas	  D.	  Kristof,	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  Times,	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   AM.	  U.	  INT’L	  L.	  REV.	   [27:2	  The	   Libyan	   saga,	  which	   began	  with	   another	   Security	   Council	  referral	  to	  the	  ICC	  proceeded	  without	  resolution	  of	  the	  ultimate	  question	   of	   where	   Qaddafi’s	   son	   Saif	   and	   the	   former	   Libyan	  intelligence	   chief	   Sussani	  would	   be	   tried.	   	   Qaddafi	   himself	   was	  killed	   during	   his	   capture	   by	   rebels	   but	   his	   son	   is	   in	   Libyan	  custody	   and	   the	   intelligence	   chief	   was	   captured	   in	   Mauritania	  while	   attempting	   to	   flee.103	   	   The	   ICC	   and	   Libya’s	   current	  government	  have	  been	  negotiating	  all	  year	  over	  the	  venue	  for	  the	  indictees’	   trials.	   	  The	   ICC	   judges	  have	  granted,	  with	  approval	  of	  the	   Office	   of	   the	   Prosecutor	   (“OTP”),	   a	   postponement	   of	   the	  request	  that	  they	  be	  turned	  over	  immediately	  to	  ICC	  custody	  and	  a	  reprieve	  granted	  until	   the	   issue	  of	  Libya’s	  objection	   to	  Article	  17	   “Admissibility”	   is	   finally	   determined	   by	   the	   ICC	   appeals	  chamber.	  	  The	  OTP	  has	  however	  said	  publicly	  that	  it	  could	  agree	  to	   a	  Libyan	   trial	   only	   if	   assured	   that	  Libya’s	   justice	   system	  met	  minimum	  international	  fairness	  standards	  including	  screening	  of	  detainees	   to	   release	   those	   against	   whom	   there	   is	   no	   proof	   of	  criminal	   conduct.	   	  Libya’s	  deficiencies	   in	   its	  police,	  prosecuting,	  and	   judicial	   organs	   have	   been	   widely	   scored	   by	   human	   rights	  groups	   as	   well	   as	   its	   inability	   to	   protect	   all	   participants	   in	   a	  major	  criminal	   trial.104	   	  The	  OTP	  has	  also	  said	   it	   is	   investigating	  the	  same	  case	  against	   the	   ICC	   indictees	  as	   the	  Libyan	  court,	   for	  complementarian	   purposes,	   and	   is	   satisfied	   the	   Libyan	  authorities	  are	  taking	  “concrete	  investigative	  steps”	  although	  it	  is	  not	   clear	   that	   the	   defendants	   have	   been	   appointed	   counsel	   or	  allowed	  access	  to	  their	  own	  retained	  lawyers.	  	  In	  May,	  then	  Chief	  Prosecutor	   Ocampo	   announced	   to	   the	   Security	   Council	   he	   was	  collecting	   evidence	   for	   a	   second	   indictment	   against	   the	   Libyan	  defendants	   focusing	   on	   gender	   crimes	   but	   relying	   on	   doctors’	  and	   soldiers’	   testimony	   to	   avoid	   recrimination	   against	  cooperating	   victims.	   	   At	   one	   point	   four	   ICC	   staffers	   were	  
 AF44-­‐F769BACECCF9/284665/OTPWeeklyBriefing1219June2012.pdf;	   Office	  of	  the	  Prosecutor,	  Int’l Criminal Court,	  105	  OTP	  WEEKLY	  BRIEFING,	  Nov.	  22–28,	  2012,	   available	   at	   http://www.icc-­‐cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/F30EC740-­‐5BCE-­‐4F99-­‐B7D3-­‐26B66D25A36A/284010/OTPWeeklyBriefing22November28November2011105.pdf.	  	   103.	   France,	  which	   has	   convicted	   Sussani	   in	   absentia,	   is	   also	   vying	   for	   his	  extradition	  to	  France.	  	   104.	   Libya	  has	  said	  it	  is	  building	  a	  “five	  star”	  maximum	  security	  prison.	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  “detained”	  in	  Libya	  but	  ultimately	  released.105	  	  An	  update	  on	  the	  current	  status	  of	  ICC	  activities	  as	  of	  the	  end	  of	   July	   includes	   the	   appointment	   by	   the	   Assembly	   of	   States	  Parties	   (“ASP”)	   of	   Fatou	   Bensounda,	   as	   the	   new	   Chief	  Prosecutor.106	  	  Also,	  there	  was	  the	  completion	  of	  the	  first	  ICC	  trial	  and	  sentencing	  of	  Dyilo	  Lubanga	  of	  the	  DRC	  of	  fourteen	  years	  for	  conscripting	   children	   under	   the	   age	   of	   fifteen	   to	   participate	   in	  hostilities.	   	   Lubanga	   had	   surrendered	   in	   2006.	   	  With	   the	   “self-­‐referral”	  of	   its	  “situation”	  by	  Mali	   to	  the	  ICC	   in	  March	  2012,	   the	  OTP	   now	   has	   seven	   situations	   under	   investigation	   and	   eight	  preliminary	  investigations	  over	  four	  continents.107	   	  Fifteen	  cases	  are	  in	  process	  involving	  twenty-­‐four	  defendants	  (six	  in	  trial	  and	  one	   in	   pretrial),	   and	   there	   are	   twelve	   outstanding	   arrest	  warrants.	   	   The	   former	   President	   of	   the	   Ivory	   Coast	   Laurent	  Ghabgo,	  indicted	  by	  the	  ICC	  for	  conducting	  a	  murderous	  rampage	  after	   his	   defeat	   at	   the	   polls,	   surrendered	   voluntarily	   after	   his	  stronghold	  was	   interdicted	  by	  UN	  and	  French	   forces.	   	  The	  High	  Commissioner	   for	   Human	   Rights	   Navanethem	   Pillary	   called	   for	  referral	   of	   the	   horrendous	   ongoing	   Syrian	   situation	   by	   the	  Security	  Council	  to	  the	  ICC,	  an	  unlikely	  occurrence	  due	  to	  Russia	  and	  China’s	  reluctance	  the	  desert	  their	  longtime	  ally.	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